

**EPISTEMOLOGIZING THE ISLAMIC CONCEPT
OF RESURRECTION IN THE HEREAFTER: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN AL-GHAZĀLĪ
AND FAZLUR RAHMAN**

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DOI: <https://doi.org/10.22452/afkar.vol23no2.8>

Abstract

The study aims at investigating the epistemology of the concept of resurrection in the hereafter in the views of al-Ghazālī and Fazlur Rahman. This study used documents analysed descriptively and epistemologically. It was found that both figures admitted that resurrection in the hereafter occurs not only in the spirit but also in the body. However, al-Ghazālī's conception was a dualism of body and soul, while Rahman believed that body and soul are inseparable entities. Epistemologically, al-Ghazālī used text, reason, and intuition as sources of knowledge while Rahman used only text and reason. Al-Ghazālī tended to apply the *kalām* and intuitive (mystical) methods, while Rahman was more concerned with the philosophical and *kalām* methods. Discussion by al-Ghazālī was undertaken in theological-metaphysical study of eschatology, while Rahman went beyond mere theological-metaphysical study in which he directed his study towards an ethical-anthropocentric discussion. This comparative study is essential for observing and developing Islamic thought and education.

Keywords: Resurrection; dualism of soul and body; epistemology; Islamic eschatology; Al-Ghazālī; Fazlur Rahman.

Khulasah

Kajian ini bertujuan mengkaji epistemologi konsep kebangkitan di akhirat menurut pandangan al-Ghazālī dan Fazlur Rahman. Kajian ini menggunakan teks yang dianalisis secara deskriptif dan epistemologi. Hasil kajian mendapati kedua-dua tokoh mengakui bahawa kebangkitan di akhirat bukan sahaja berlaku pada roh tetapi juga jasad. Walau bagaimanapun, konsep al-Ghazālī adalah dualisme jasad dan roh, manakala Rahman percaya bahawa kedua-duanya adalah entiti yang tidak dapat dipisahkan. Dari aspek epistemologi, al-Ghazālī menggunakan teks, akal, dan intuisi sebagai sumber ilmu, manakala Rahman hanya menggunakan teks dan akal. Al-Ghazālī cenderung menggunakan kaedah *kalām* dan intuitif (mistik), manakala Rahman lebih mementingkan kaedah falsafah dan *kalām*. Perbincangan oleh al-Ghazālī dilakukan dalam kajian teologi-metafizik eskatologi, manakala Rahman melangkaui kajian teologi-metafizik semata-mata di mana beliau mengarahkan kajiannya ke arah perbincangan etika-antroposentrik. Kajian perbandingan ini penting untuk memerhati dan mengembangkan pemikiran dan pendidikan Islam.

Kata kunci: Kebangkitan; dualisme jiwa dan roh; epistemologi; eskatologi Islam; Al-Ghazālī; Fazlur Rahman.

Introduction

In theological discourses in the Muslim world, resurrection in the hereafter is a study in Islamic eschatology that was debated between philosophers and theologians especially in the eleventh and twelfth

centuries.¹ The question in the debate was whether the resurrection occurs in the soul only or in the body as well. The philosophers represented by Ibn Sīnā believed that resurrection occurs spiritually or occurs only in the soul by illustrating that if the soul and body are in a vacuum while the eyes of someone are closed and the organs are separated, he/she will still be aware of the existence of his/her soul even if he/she does not have an idea of his/her body. Existence means being free from space. The determination is that someone exists not by means of his/her senses or body but by means of his/her soul. Therefore, it is only his/her soul that is certain of its resurrection.² Al-Ghazālī, representing theologians, rejected this view on the ground that Allah has the power to bring back dead bodies so that those who do not believe in this doctrine in principle deny His power.³

Al-Ghazālī's thesis was later criticized by another philosopher Ibn Rushd, arguing that the thesis was more suitable for the common people because when the Prophet said that heaven has never been seen by the eyes, never heard by the ears, and never crossed the human heart, that means that the Prophet explained the hereafter in a spiritual form.⁴ However, this counter did not make a significant impression because al-Ghazālī's influence was remarkably great among Muslims.⁵ As a result, this study

¹ See Imtiyaz Yusuf, "Discussion between al-Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd about the Nature of Resurrection," *Islamic Studies* 25, no. 2 (1986), 181-195; Sibawaihi, *Eskatologi al-Gazali dan Fazlur Rahman: Studi Komparatif Epistemologi Klasik-Kontemporer* (Yogyakarta: Islamika, 2004), 106-111.

² Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr, 1960), 119-120.

³ Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1966), 289-290; al-Ghazālī, *al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl* (Beirut: Al-Maktabah al-Sha'biyyah, n.d.), 51.

⁴ Ibn Rushd, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1971), II: 870.

⁵ Sibawaihi, *Eskatologi al-Gazali dan Fazlur Rahman*, 14-15, 110.

seemed dead and has not appeared since then. Even, the bigger impact of the attack on those philosophers, according to Fazlur Rahman, is that the study of Islamic eschatology in general has no longer been scientifically studied and critically developed.⁶

The attention of Rahman to this impact was quite large by studying or criticizing the concept of resurrection in the hereafter. Rahman's study in this case did not start from the question of whether the resurrection occurs in body or soul but was based on a critical point of view which was directed at analysing the concept of resurrection from the Qur'ānic perspective. The assumption underlying his study was that in Islamic eschatology there have been many conceptions that can be criticized and developed but they cannot be fully seen by Muslims because of the influence of orthodoxy which was driven by al-Ghazālī in standardizing Islamic teachings.⁷

For this reason, this study highlights the concept of resurrection in the hereafter is meant to compare the view of al-Ghazālī, as a representative of theologians in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, to that of Rahman, who represents modern Muslims. However, the study is not about to be dissolved in the issue, which was always debated, but rather emphasizes fundamental things that underlie the conceptions of the two figures which are analysed philosophically.

This study analyses the epistemology of the concept of resurrection in the hereafter by investigating the sources and methods of knowledge used by al-Ghazālī and Rahman. After that, it will be discussed matters that are

⁶ Fazlur Rahman, *Islam* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 120; Fazlur Rahman, "Islamic Philosophy," in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc. & The Free Press, 1972), IV: 222.

⁷ Fazlur Rahman, *Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy and Orthodoxy* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958), 92-93.

relevant to what Muslims need to learn in the current era in addressing the existing problems related to the topic which is intended to enrich the eschatological insight in Islamic scholarship or education. The world of Islamic education has so far recognized al-Ghazālī as a figure who had great influence in the tradition of belief and scholarship, while Rahman is more focused on his critical attitude towards the development of Islamic education.

Al-Ghazālī and Fazlur Rahman

Al-Ghazālī, whose full name is Abū Hāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī al-Ṭūsī al-Shāfi‘ī, was born in Tus, Khorasan (Iraq) in 450H/1058M.⁸ The early education he received after his father died was Sufism. In his youth, he studied at Nishapur, also Khorasan, which at that time was one of the most important centres of knowledge in the Islamic world. He was a student of Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī at Madrasah al-Nizāmiyyah Nishapur. Among the disciplines offered at this madrasah were theology, Islamic law, philosophy, logic, Sufism, and the natural sciences. Through al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī became acquainted with Niẓām al-Mulk, the Prime Minister of the Seljuk Sulṭān Mālik-Shāh, who was the founder of *madrasahs* of al-Nizāmiyyah. In 1091, al-Ghazālī was appointed as a teacher at the Madrasah al-Nizāmiyyah Baghdad.⁹

Al-Ghazālī's period was a time of conflict between various religious sects/schools. In the political field, the Dawlah ‘Abbāsiyyah, which was previously controlled by the Banī Buwayh (Iran), was then controlled by the Banī Seljuk (Turkey). If the Banī Buwayh gave a lot of help to

⁸ Duncan B. Macdonald, "The Life of al-Gazali, with Special Reference to His Religious Experiences and Opinions," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 20 (1899).

⁹ For the full biography of al-Ghazālī, see e.g. Macdonald, "The Life of al-Gazali"; W. Montgomery Watt, *Al-Ghazali: The Muslim Intellectual* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1963).

the Mu'tazilah because they were Shi'ah, then the Bani Seljuk turned to Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah because they belonged to this sect. However, in reality, Shi'ah was still a strong influence in society, in addition to philosophers with various traditions as well.

In addition, there were also theologians (*mutakallimūn*) who did not stop debating. They all enliven the atmosphere with debates in various beliefs and studies. This period was also known for the many madrasahs founded by Nizām al-Mulk spreading in many cities such as Baghdād, Baṣrah, Isfahān, Nishapūr, and Balkh. The purpose of their establishment, of course, was to defend the state's official school (Ahl al-Sunnah). It was at this time that al-Ghazālī demonstrated his role as the defender of the state's official school of thought. However, the biggest impetus in this endeavour was actually to find convincing knowledge or true knowledge.¹⁰ The development of al-Ghazālī's thought was quite complex, at first, he was a *faqīh*, then turned into a philosopher, and then became a Sufi.¹¹ It was at this last moment that works that seemed conservative and subordinated discursive ideas including the production of eschatological texts, emerged.¹²

Different from al-Ghazālī who lived in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Rahman was a thinker who lived in the modern era. Born in Hazara (formerly India, now Pakistan), on September 21, 1919, he was raised in a family with a background in the Hanafī school, a Sunni school that tends to be more rational than others. He studied at Punjab University majoring in Eastern studies until he received a Master's degree in 1942. In 1946, he

¹⁰ M. Amin Abdullah, *Studi Agama: Normativitas atau Historisitas?* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1999), 269.

¹¹ Regarding the stages of his scientific development, it can be seen in his autobiography *Al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl*.

¹² See *Ibid.*, 51; al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, 288-290.

deepened his studies at Oxford University until he received a doctorate in literature in 1949. Then he taught successively at Durham University, England, being appointed professor of philosophy at McGill University, Canada. Although raised in a traditional Hanafi school culture, Rahman since his teens had escaped from the confines of the Sunni school and developed his thoughts independently. This can be seen in his critical attitudes, both towards Shi'ah and Sunni.¹³

Rahman's criticism became more visible when he was appointed a member of the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology of the Pakistani government in 1964. He carried out the mandate to develop research interpreting Islam in rational and scientific themes to meet the needs of a progressive modern society.¹⁴ It was here that he grappled intensely in the Islamization project in his country, Pakistan, which drew strong attacks from conservatives. The culmination of this attack exploded when the first two chapters of his first work, *Islam*, were translated into Urdu and published in the *Journal of Fikr-u-Nazr*. Therefore, Rahman then moved to the University of Chicago and developed his thoughts there until his death on July 26, 1988.¹⁵

Epistemologizing the Islamic Concept of Resurrection in the Hereafter: A Theoretical Framework

Resurrection in the hereafter is a concept in Islamic eschatology. In the Muslim tradition, the discussion of

¹³ Rahman even called for a complete and total reformulation of the historical heritage, both theology and law of the Sunnis and Shiites. See Rahman, *Islam*.

¹⁴ Fazlur Rahman, "Some Islamic Issues in the Ayub Khan Era, Essay on Islamic Civilization," in *Essays on Islamic Civilization*, ed. Donald P. Little, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), 285.

¹⁵ Rahman's biodata, in full, can be looked in his "An Autobiographical Note," in *The Courage of Conviction*, ed. Philip L. Berman (New York: Ballantine Books, 1985), 135-159.

eschatology has been quite diverse. Some of them discussed the concepts of eschatology separately like al-Sha‘rānī and al-Suyūṭī. Al-Sha‘rānī explored only the complexities of the Day of Judgment and the inhabitants of Paradise. These two topics are in Chapters 11 and 12 of his book which basically contains not only eschatological concepts but also other concepts related to the consequences of committing immoral acts.¹⁶ Al-Suyūṭī seems to have limited his discussion to eschatology but he focused only on death and the grave.¹⁷ However, there are also those whose discussion is quite comprehensive, such as al-Qurtūbī and al-Ghazālī himself, although his discussions on eschatology are found in his various works. The discussion of al-Qurtūbī covers at least death, the grave, the Day of Judgment, and heaven and hell.¹⁸

In the hands of Western scholars, the general description of Islamic eschatology highlights two aspects: the end of the world and the hereafter.¹⁹ For the end of the world, Hamblin and Peterson,²⁰ Izutsu,²¹ Owen,²² and

¹⁶ ‘Abd al-Wahhāb ibn Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī al-Sha‘rānī, *al-Yawāqūt wa al-Jawāhir fī Bayān ‘Aqā’id al-Akābir* (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī & Mu’assasah al-Tārikh al-‘Arabī, 1972).

¹⁷ Jalāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Suyūṭī, *Sharḥ al-Ṣudūr bi Sharḥ Hāl al-Mawtā wa al-Qubūr* (Cairo: Dār al-Madanī, 1985).

¹⁸ Abī ‘Abd Allāh al-Qurtūbī, *Kitāb al-Tadhkirah bi Aḥwāl al-Mawtā wa Umūr al-Ākhirah* (Riyadh: Maktabah Dār al-Minhāj, n.d).

¹⁹ William J. Hamblin and Daniel C. Peterson, "Eschatology," in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, ed. John L. Esposito, et al. (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), I:440; H. P. Owen, "Eschatology," in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc. & The Free Press, 1972), III: 48.

²⁰ Hamblin and Peterson, "Eschatology", 440-442.

²¹ Toshihiko Izutsu, *God and Man in the Koran: Semantics of the Koranic Weltanschauung* (Tokyo: The Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1964), 90-94.

²² Owen, "Eschatology," 48-49; Cyril Glasse, *The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam* (London: Stacey International, 1989), 107-110.

Glasse,²³ direct their discussion to the doomsday and eschatological figures: Ya'jūj and Ma'jūj, al-Imām al-Mahdī, Dajjāl, and 'Īsā; and for the hereafter, their discussion includes *barzakh*, resurrection including the afterlife court, as well as heaven and hell. Therefore, Islamic eschatology generally can be classified into death, *barzakh*, doomsday, resurrection, and heaven and hell. Based on this classification, if viewed from the order, resurrection is in-between the doomsday and heaven and hell, which means that resurrection occurs after the doomsday and ends before humans enter heaven or hell.

Discussion on resurrection in the hereafter among Muslim scholars, who are generally theologians, are always directed at efforts to illustrate the enormity of post-doomsday events, the process of reviving humans from their sleep, the very tense situations that humans experience in the *maḥshar* to be tried in divine court, and the process of human entry into the places of eternity, heaven or hell.²⁴ These illustrations are made in the form of a narrative about not only the terrible things but also the very pleasant ones that humans will experience. Such illustrations generally circulate massively in the Islamic world, and one of the most prominent figures in this regard is al-Ghazālī,²⁵ whose thoughts can be seen in *al-Durrah al-Fākhīrah fī Kashf 'Ulūm al-Ākhirah*, *al-*

²³ Glasse, *The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam*, 107.

²⁴ There are at least five works on eschatology that influence massively in the Muslim world: *al-Durrah al-Fākhīrah fī Kashf 'Ulūm al-Ākhirah* by al-Ghazālī (11th century), *Kitāb al-Rūḥ* by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (14th century, which is generally seen as one of the most authoritative sources about the soul after physical death), *Buṣhrā al-Ka'ib bi Liqā' al-Ḥabīb* by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (15th century), *Kitāb al-Ḥaqā'iq wa al-Daqā'iq* by Abū Layth al-Samarqandī (17th century), and *Kitāb Aḥwāl al-Qiyāmah* (without author's name). Jane Idleman Smith and Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, *The Islamic Understanding of Death and Resurrection* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981), 31-32.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

Maḍnūn bih 'alā Ghayr Ahlih, Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, and al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl. In this study, the resurrection concept of this figure is confronted with Rahman's resurrection concept, whose thoughts can be seen in *Major Themes of the Quran, Islam, Health and Medicine in the Islamic Tradition, Some Recent Books on the Qur'an by Western Authors, Islam & Modernity, Ibn Sīnā, The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, and Islamic Philosophy.* These references mentioned are then the primary data sources for this study.

The commonly recognized sources of knowledge in epistemology are the reason, senses, and intuition.²⁶ However, some epistemologists, especially those who are from religious traditions, think that these three sources of knowledge are not enough to underlie all kinds of knowledge. In the Muslim world, there has been a struggle shown by scholars such as al-Jābirī²⁷ and Zayd²⁸ in building epistemological theories that accommodate the apocalyptic text to be a source of knowledge. Thus, because this research explores Islamic studies, the apocalyptic text has also become one of the recognized sources of knowledge.

As for methods of knowledge, they refer to the sources of knowledge. There are three methods adopted in this study: the *kalām* method, philosophical method, and intuitive (mystical) method. The *kalām* method is a dialectical method of apocalyptic text (*naṣṣ*) and reason by putting the apocalyptic text in a fundamental position. In

²⁶ See Louis O. Kattsoff, *Pengantar Filsafat*, trans. Soejono Soemargono (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana Yogya, 1987), 136-146; D. W. Hamlyn, "Epistemology, History of," in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* III, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc. & The Free Press, 1972), 8-38.

²⁷ Muḥammad 'Ābid al-Jābirī, *Takwīn al-'Aql al-'Arabī* (Beirut: al-Markadh al-Thaqāfī al-'Arabī, 1990), 338-339.

²⁸ Naṣr Ḥamid Abū Zayd, *Maḥmūm al-Naṣṣ: Dirāsah fī 'Ulūm al-Qur'an* (Beirut: Al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-'Arabī, 1996), 9.

this respect, other sources are only supported for the apocalyptic text. Therefore, the products or arguments of this method appear to be explanatory, not exploratory.²⁹ It emphasizes the outer-textual, exoteric, concrete, and final dimensions.³⁰

The philosophical method emphasizes the esoteric, inner, transcendental, abstract, and open-ended dimensions.³¹ If the starting point of *kalām* is a revelation, and reason only serves to support what revelation says, the starting point of philosophy is the reason.³² The philosophical method was generally influenced by the Greek tradition so that although its references are infinite, in reality, it is often limited by the frame of reference it receives from works transmitted to it from Greece. The philosophical method is characterized by at least three characteristics: the discussion focuses on the formulation of fundamental ideas for the object under study; the introduction and deepening of the fundamental issues can form critical thinking patterns; and the results of the discussion can form a way of thinking that prioritizes intellectual freedom, tolerance of various views, and freedom from dogmatism and fanaticism.³³

As for the intuitive (mystical) method, it is based on individual intuitive experience, which is not pursued through discursive thinking. It looks more subtle than the

²⁹ Sari Nuseibeh, "Epistemology," in *History of Islamic Philosophy*, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (London & New York: Routledge, 1996), 828.

³⁰ M. Amin Abdullah, "Rekonstruksi Metodologi Studi Agama dalam Masyarakat Multikultural dan Multireligius," *Pidato Pengukuhan Guru Besar Ilmu Filsafat* (Yogyakarta: IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2000), 14.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Michael E. Marmura, "Falsafah," in *The Encyclopedia of Religion* V, ed. Mircea Eliade (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, & London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1987), 267.

³³ Abdullah, "Rekonstruksi Metodologi Studi Agama," 11-13.

analytical approach because it is a form of thought that applies not only to reason but also to personal feelings. In this way, it hits targets that no other method of philosophy could reach.³⁴ The mystical method is a challenging method, in which language is perceived as hindering understanding. In this method, knowledge is a form of individual 'feeling,' so this method often communicates its theories through metaphors and parables rather than through certain linguistic mechanisms. His theories can be applied in the form of poetry and stories rather than in exposition.³⁵

Concept of Resurrection in the Hereafter of al-Ghazālī and Fazlur Rahman

The view of the philosophers, who did not believe in the resurrection of the body, for al-Ghazālī,³⁶ is a denial of Allah's power because whether Allah raises man in a spiritual form or a physical form, it is not a problem for Him. Nothing can prevent His will. It is possible for God to present man in his/her complete form, and since this is a possibility, it is not human authority to go beyond all that is possible for Him. The Qur'ān, *Sūrah* 32:17, states,

فَلَا تَعْلَمُ نَفْسٌ مَّا أُخْفِيَ لَهُم مِّن قُرَّةِ أَعْيُنٍ جَزَاءً لِّمِمَّا كَانُوا
يَعْمَلُونَ

³⁴ Oliver Leaman, *A Brief Introduction of Islamic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 73; Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "The Meaning and Concept of Philosophy in Islam," in *History of Islamic Philosophy*, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman (London & New York: Routledge, 1996), 24-25.

³⁵ Nuseibeh, "Epistemology", 830.

³⁶ Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, 289-290.

Now no person knows what delights of the eye are kept hidden (in reserve) for them—as a reward for their (good) deeds.³⁷

Al-Ghazālī believed that there are certain things related to God's promises which the soul alone is unable to know.³⁸ What is promised will certainly be known by something perfect, and that perfection is made possible by the union of soul and body, and therefore this union becomes obligatory to be justified. Furthermore, based on two *aḥādīth*, humans will come on the day of resurrection naked except for certain people who are clothed from Heaven; and Muslims will be gathered with the shroud that is worn by them.³⁹

Al-Ghazālī widened his argument with the analogy that what should be more surprising is not how the soul will be reunited with the body, but rather the process of first attaching the soul to the body.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the human body is formed by stages, evolutive. The soul and body are interdependent and interconnected, in which the perfection of their interconnectedness takes place in an evolutionary manner, but the body which is resurrected at the second time is derived from the parts which were previously united with the body, although later the parts are scattered everywhere and lost its appearance and shape.⁴¹ In this context, *nafs* is identical with the *rūḥ* as *al-laṭīfah al-rūḥāniyyah*. This is as seen in al-Ghazālī's

³⁷ 'Abdullah Yusuf 'Ali, *The Meaning of the Holy Qur'an: Complete Translation with Selected Notes* (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 1996), 415.

³⁸ Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, 289-290.

³⁹ Al-Ghazālī, *al-Durrah al-Fākhīrah fī Kashf 'Ulūm al-Ākhirah*, ed. Muḥammad 'Abd al-Khāliq 'Abd al-Qādir Aḥmad 'Aṭā (Beirut: Mu'assasah al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyyah, 1992), 47-48.

⁴⁰ Al-Ghazālī, "Al-Maḍnūn bih 'alā Ghayr Ahlih," in al-Ghazālī, *Majmū'ah Rasā'il al-Imām al-Ghazālī* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1996), 351.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 352.

explanation of the separation of the *rūḥ* or *nafs* from the body when death occurs.⁴² But more broadly, the *nafs* is different from the *rūḥ* in that *rūḥ* has the potential for *ammārah* (anger) and *shahwah* (lust).⁴³

Meanwhile, as a contemporary thinker, Rahman, who could freely study or even criticize the predecessors, did not directly and firmly discuss the condition of the human that would be resurrected in the hereafter but instead offered a different methodological point of view. Rahman attributed the historical response of eschatological verses to the rejection of the people of Mecca towards physical resurrection;⁴⁴ the Mecca people questioned the possibility of the resurrection of the shattered bones; a very literal question.

Regarding the question of whether the body will be raised together with the soul, Rahman had a completely different and new conception when compared to al-Ghazālī and the philosophers (Ibn Sīnā, al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd). Rahman first elaborated the ideas of philosophers who adhered to the doctrine of the dualism of body and soul:

From Greek epistemological and metaphysical theories, again, the Muslim philosophers acquired the idea of a radical dualism between body and mind [soul], which under Greco-Christian influences had also developed into an out-and-out ethical dualism between the material and the spiritual. This affected the Muslim philosophers' eschatological teaching very fundamentally. The philosopher al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) held that only the soul survived in an individual and, further, that only the souls

⁴² Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, IV: 490.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, III: 4-5.

⁴⁴ Fazlur Rahman, "Some Recent Books on the Qur'an by Western Authors," *The Journal of Religion* 64 (1984), 78.

of thinkers survived, 'undeveloped' minds being destroyed at death. Ibn Sīnā held that all human souls survived, body being unresurrectible, although he allowed that souls, after being separated from their bodies, especially those that are 'undeveloped' but morally virtuous, felt a kind of 'physical' pleasure since they were incapable of experiencing purely mental states.... Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 594/1198), the Spanish Arab philosopher who introduced medieval Europe to Aristotle in his own interpretation, came nearer to orthodox Islam with his doctrine that although the same body could not be identically resurrected, a numerically different but qualitatively identical body, a *simulacrum*, would be supplied.⁴⁵

Rahman criticized the idea of the dualism of soul and body held by those philosophers.⁴⁶ In this criticism, Rahman, in turn, directed his 'arrow' at the representation of the theologian, al-Ghazālī, because not different from al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and Ibn Rushd, al-Ghazālī also embraced the idea of dualism, even he was regarded as the pioneer of this idea for orthodox Muslims. Therefore, to respond to the two opposing groups, Rahman firmly stated that, "The Quran does not appear to endorse the mind of doctrine of a radical mind-body dualism."⁴⁷

According to Rahman,⁴⁸ the term *nafs*, which is stated repeatedly in the Qur'ān and is often translated as

⁴⁵ Rahman, *Islam*, 118-119.

⁴⁶ See Fazlur Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'an* (Chicago & Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980), 17.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Fazlur Rahman, *Health and Medicine in the Islamic Tradition: Change and Identity* (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1987), 21.

soul, basically means self or something which is the pronoun 'self,' for example itself, he himself, and so forth. *Nafs* is not properly understood as soul, because this conception does not appear in the Qur'ān. Humans, as the Qur'ān describes them, is a complete organism that functions in a certain way. Man is not only the (physical) body but also includes a part within itself, which can be called the soul; both form one organized unit. It is on this basis that the Qur'ān speaks of the belief in a resurrection after death.

So, although Rahman was on the one hand similar to al-Ghazālī, that was, in his rejection of the conception of philosophers who did not recognize the resurrection of the body, on the other hand, both differed in the recognition of the idea of a dualism of soul and body. In the view of Rahman,⁴⁹ the idea of body-soul dualism that has infiltrated Islamic teachings was basically found in Greek philosophy, Christianity, and Hinduism. Further development of this idea was what philosophers believed: the belief in the immortality of the soul and the destruction of the body after death for all eternity. However, this continued development did not influence orthodox doctrine, although Sufis also hold that view. Rahman argued that "the Quran could not have embraced a notion of the soul as being healthy and the body being sick or vice versa."⁵⁰

Furthermore, according to Rahman,⁵¹ the controversy surrounding the idea of dualism has led to other debates, especially in interpreting the Qur'ān, *Sūrah* 75:22-23, about whether God can be seen physically and about the faces of the unbelievers who become dark and covered

⁴⁹ Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'an*, 17.

⁵⁰ Rahman, *Health and Medicine in the Islamic Tradition*, 21.

⁵¹ Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'an*, 113.

with dust. For the first case, Rahman⁵² also pays attention to the verses in the *Sūrah*: 76:11; 80:39; 83:24; and 10:26. For the second case, he also focuses on the verses in the *Sūrah*: 80:40-41; 10:27; 68:43; and 70:44. In this regard, Rahman⁵³ believed that due to the inclusion of Hellenistic influence and other religious doctrines, medieval Muslims understood the verses of the Qur'ān partially, so that sometimes the conceptions they taught were even foreign to the Qur'ān.

Rahman's rejection of the dualism was based not only on the Qur'ān but also on the Greek philosophy perspective. If the idea of dualism is allegedly more influenced by the Greek philosopher Plato (427-347 BC), then in rejecting this conception, Rahman used the perspective of Descartes (1596-1650) in his famous proposition "*cogito ergo sum*" (I think, therefore I am).⁵⁴ The conclusion, in this case, is that the soul and body cannot be logically separated from each other. Therefore, towards philosophers, Rahman then had his own judgment by considering them not so firm or not flexible enough; this mistake arose due to their lack of courage and religious conviction.⁵⁵

Thus, both those philosophers (al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and Ibn Rushd) and the representation of orthodox theologians (al-Ghazālī) did not escape Rahman's criticism regarding the concept of dualism of soul and

⁵² For the first case, Rahman also pays attention to the verses in the *Sūrahs*: 76:11; 80:39; 83:24; and 10:26. For the second case, he also focuses on the verses in the *Sūrahs*: 80:40-41; 10:27; 68:43; and 70:44. See *ibid*.

⁵³ Fazlur Rahman, *Islam & Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 132.

⁵⁴ Fazlur Rahman, "Ibn Sīnā," in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, ed. M. M. Sharif (Delhi: Low Price Publications, 1995), 487-488.

⁵⁵ Frederick Mathewson Denny, "Fazlur Rahman: Muslim Intellectual," *The Muslim World* 79, no. 2 (1989): 92.

body. Rahman's criticism of al-Ghazālī was based not only on the meaning of resurrection *an sich*, but also on the implications arising from al-Ghazālī's attack on philosophers. Although Rahman himself fundamentally disagreed with the ideas of those philosophers, he deeply regretted the impact this attack has had.⁵⁶

Sources and Methods of Knowledge of al-Ghazālī dan Fazlur Rahman in the Concept of Resurrection in the Hereafter

Al-Ghazālī and Rahman equally put eschatology in a significant discussion, but conceptually both differ in understanding the concept of resurrection in the hereafter. Not only conceptually, the differences between the two also seem epistemologically.

In terms of sources of knowledge, both equally used text and reason. In the context of the text, both always based their views on the Qur'ān by quoting verses and then translating or interpreting them. The most striking difference is that al-Ghazālī quoted or based his conception on the *ḥadīth*, whereas Rahman did not use any *ḥadīth* as his source. Both al-Ghazālī and Rahman, for example, admitted that death is a phase towards the afterlife, and both analogized death with sleep. However, their opinion was based on different textual sources. Rahman based his views on the Qur'ān *Sūrah* 39: 42 that "God receives the souls when they die and those who do not die he receives them in their sleep; he then keeps those for whom he has decreed death while others he releases until the appointed term..."⁵⁷ while al-Ghazālī based his opinion on the hadith that "Humans actually sleep, when they die, then they wake up."⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Rahman, "Islamic Philosophy," 222; Rahman, *Islam*, 120.

⁵⁷ Rahman, *Health and Medicine in the Islamic Tradition*, 127-128;

⁵⁸ Al-Ghazālī, *al-Durrah al-Fākhīrah*, 44; al-Ghazālī, *al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl*, 30.

This can be attributed to the fact that Rahman was quite critical of *ḥadīth* after seeing that *ḥadīth* 'had been subjected to massive forgery' in the past.⁵⁹ In general, Rahman was very fixated on the Qur'ān, so he often rejected an idea because he thought that the idea was not supported by the Qur'ān. For example, Rahman asserted that "The Quran does not appear to endorse the mind of doctrine of a radical mind-body dualism found in Greek philosophy, Christianity, or Hinduism."⁶⁰

Al-Ghazālī's conception of the dualism of soul-body, as described above, was severely criticized by Rahman because he considered this conception incompatible with the Qur'ān. Apart from the text, al-Ghazālī and Rahman also used reason as the source of knowledge. Al-Ghazālī⁶¹ believed that reason is sufficiently capable of capturing not only the limited, but also the infinite. Therefore, everything can become the object of reason,⁶² without being hindered except the reason itself which closes itself to digesting it.⁶³ However, the excessive use of reason was criticized by al-Ghazālī.⁶⁴ This excessive use of reason cannot necessarily be aimed at philosophy because al-Ghazālī himself used philosophy, including when attacking philosophers.

One of the philosophical figures who influenced al-Ghazālī's thought was Aristotle (384-322 BC), especially his logic. Aristotle's logic, which is often called formal logic, is an analysis of forms of thought that are related to

⁵⁹ For more details, see Fazlur Rahman, *Islamic Methodology in History* (Delhi: Adam Publishers & Distributors, 1994), 1-84.

⁶⁰ Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'an*, 17.

⁶¹ Al-Ghazālī, *Mishkāt al-Anwār*, ed. Abū al-'Alā 'Aḥī (Cairo: Dār al-Qawmiyyah, 1964), 55.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 45-46.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁶⁴ Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, 296.

internal and external realities.⁶⁵ This basic principle of logic was intended as a statement that contains universal truth and was considered an axiom so that it does not need to be proven. There are three parts of this basic principle of logic: (1) The affirmation; (2) The contradiction; (3) The law of excluded middle.⁶⁶

Aristotle⁶⁷ also had methods of data inference or thinking systems and arguments known as deduction and induction. The deduction argument starts from an unquestionable general truth and based on that general truth another specific truth is inferred. For Aristotle, the deduction method is the perfect way to produce knowledge. Therefore, almost all logical discussions are directed at proving deductions. This method was in turn elaborated in the form of syllogism. However, deduction or in the form of syllogism in Islamic epistemology is somewhat different from Aristotle's deduction. Because, in Islamic epistemology, texts are recognized as the highest source of knowledge, then an *istidlāl* (inferring or legal reasoning) analysis is carried out with linguistic principles which then bring up conclusions. This is the system of thinking which in al-Jābirī's terms is called the *bayānī*.⁶⁸ As for induction proof, what Aristotle calls *epagôgê*,⁶⁹ it is a method of inference that starts from special cases, and then produces general knowledge. This

⁶⁵ Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* (London: Search Press & New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1946), I: 277.

⁶⁶ See Robin Smith, "Logic," in *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 33-39.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 29-33; Kattsoff, *Pengantar Filsafat*, 27-28.

⁶⁸ Muḥammad 'Ābid al-Jābirī, *Bunyah al-'Aql al-'Arabī: Dirāsah Taḥlīliyyah Naqdiyyah li Nuẓum al-Ma'rifah fī al-Thaqāfah al-'Arabiyyah* (Beirut: Markadh Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-'Arabiyyah, 1990), 13ff.

⁶⁹ Smith, "Logic," 30.

method did not get much attention from Aristotle, perhaps because truth was probable or relative.

From the description of Aristotle's mindset, it seems that al-Ghazālī used the contradiction logic principle and the deductive thinking method. In the first, al-Ghazālī seems to contrapose everything dichotomically. For example, when claiming the correctness of his views towards philosophers in understanding the resurrection, al-Ghazālī rejected them. In this case, there is no truth in the two different conceptions. That is, if the conclusion is that what is raised is soul and body, then any opinion other than that is wrong and therefore must be rejected. The deductive method is seen when al-Ghazālī explained that life in the afterlife arises from a non-evolutive process. In this case, al-Ghazālī put forward the premises in the hypothetical syllogism⁷⁰ of an example of the mouse⁷¹—the lines are from the author,

Major premise	<u>Everything that arises out of the process of offspring will be risen again gradually, because as it was originally arising, it comes into existence gradually</u>
Minor premise	<u>Humans are creatures that are created through a process of offspring</u>
Conclusion	<u>Humans will be resurrected from the parts</u>

⁷⁰ Hypothetical syllogism is distinguished from categorical syllogism. The former has the major premise in the form of hypothetical propositions while the minor premise and the conclusion are categorical propositions. The second consists of categorical propositions. See E. Sumaryono, *Dasar-dasar Logika* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1999), 89ff. Abdullah also attributes al-Ghazālī method to the hypothetical syllogism, a procedure that focuses primarily on the problem of incomplete induction. M. Amin Abdullah, *The Idea of Universality of Ethical Norms in Ghazālī & Kant* (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1992), 194. This method, according to Abdullah, is very strategic and decisive because only by using this method al-Ghazālī can easily defend and prove the validity of his religious doctrine. See *ibid.*, 198.

⁷¹ See al-Ghazālī, "Al-Maḍnūn bih 'Alā Ghayr Ahlih," 351.

	that were previously fused with the body, even though the parts have fallen apart, and their shape have lost
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This deductive method was more often used by al-Ghazālī in *fiqh*,⁷² so that some observers confirmed that al-Ghazālī followed this procedure. Watt, for example, said, "... and, more importantly, it included Aristotelian logic. He himself was greatly impressed by the logical works of Aristotle especially those on the syllogism."⁷³

Apart from Aristotle, another Greek philosopher who was influential in the conception of al-Ghazālī was Plato. The concept of dualism of soul and body used by al-Ghazālī turned out to have the influence of Platonism or Plato who first taught the concept. According to Plato,⁷⁴ everything contains two things: ideas and non-ideas (real ones). The essence of existence is idea, which is not visible in real terms, not non-idea that can be grasped by the senses. Idea is the goal or end of all sense forms. This idea was understood by al-Ghazālī as soul and non-idea as body. Al-Ghazālī himself⁷⁵ stated that the ones who most influenced his philosophical thinking were Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī. As Rahman⁷⁶ admitted, both philosophers have historical roots in Greece. So, when al-Ghazālī blasphemed their conception of resurrection, basically they all referred to the same argument, namely admitting the idea of dualism of soul and body imported from Greece. In this case, Ibn ‘Arabī, as quoted by Ibn

⁷² See for example al-Ghazālī, "al-Qistās al-Mustaqīm," in al-Ghazālī, *Majmū‘ah Rasā’il al-Imām al-Ghazālī* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1996), 187.

⁷³ W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology: An Extended Survey* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 90.

⁷⁴ Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1974), 137.

⁷⁵ Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah*, 20.

⁷⁶ Rahman, "Ibn Sīnā," 480; Rahman, "Islamic Philosophy," 220-222.

Taymiyyah, confirmed that, "Abū Hāmid (al-Ghazālī) had entered the midst of the philosophers, then he tried to leave, but was unsuccessful."⁷⁷ More specifically, Marmura believes that although al-Ghazālī rejects Ibn Sīnā's idea of resurrection, he has shown little dislike for this idea in much of his writings, and that in general Ibn Sīnā's psychology has had considerable influence on him.⁷⁸

Similar to al-Ghazālī, Rahman also appreciated the use of reason proportionally.⁷⁹ In the context of free-thought, Rahman stated that, "Its remedy is not to stifle it but to keep on criticizing it. Intellectualism is something so frail that in shackles it surely dies."⁸⁰ Rahman also said that, "It is a sheer delusion to imagine that by stifling free, positive though one can save religion for by doing so, religion itself gets starved and impoverished."⁸¹

The significance of reason for al-Ghazālī was based on the desire to multiply the praiseworthy sciences, which he distinguished from the disgraceful sciences,⁸² whereas for Rahman, reason was significant in relation to morality.⁸³ That Rahman linked reason with morality, this was based on the primordial covenant committed by humans to God, with which humans are ready to bear the

⁷⁷ Ibn Taimiyyah, *Naqd al-Mantiq* (Cairo: al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyah, 1951), 56.

⁷⁸ Michael E. Marmura, "Ghazālī's Attitude to the Secular Sciences and Logic," *Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science*, ed. George F. Hourani (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), 101-102.

⁷⁹ See his conception on reason in Rahman, *Islamic Methodology in History*, 132-135; Rahman, *Islam*, 41.

⁸⁰ Rahman, *Islamic Methodology in History*, 134-135.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 132.

⁸² See his conception on reason in *Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn* I (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, n.d.), 15-54.

⁸³ See Rahman, *Islam*, 33; Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'an*, 14-15, 116; Rahman, *Islam & Modernity*, 156.

burden of moral responsibility for their willingness to become caliphs on earth.⁸⁴ In accordance with this perspective, so long as morality is maintained, reason can be used, including in philosophy. Philosophy, according to Rahman,⁸⁵ cannot be denied by truth. Religious truths are basically philosophical truths.⁸⁶ Therefore, philosophy should not be opposed to religion (theology). Philosophy must be preserved and allowed to grow so that religion and other disciplines are not simply understood dryly. Philosophy is certainly useful for theology because theology's goal is to construct a worldview based on the Qur'ān with the help of the intellectual tools that philosophy provides in part.⁸⁷

In the use of reason or philosophy, Rahman required conformity with the Qur'ān. Rahman's rejection of the idea of a typical medieval dualism of soul and body was not because the idea originated from (Greek) philosophy but because the idea was not justified in the Qur'ān.⁸⁸ Rahman's response to this philosophy was not always negative, because in breaking this Platonist conception, he proposed Descartes' proposition, which also comes from philosophy. Based on Descartes' proposition, "*cogito ergo sum*,"⁸⁹ consciousness of self and its existence or soul and body are logically inseparable.⁹⁰ Although Descartes basically followed the pattern of dualism, his proposition was interpreted by Rahman from a different perspective. Until he argued that Ibn Sīnā as well as other Muslim

⁸⁴ Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'an*, 24.

⁸⁵ Fazlur Rahman, "Modern Muslim Thought," *The Muslim World* 45 (1955), 25.

⁸⁶ Rahman, *Islam*, 119.

⁸⁷ Rahman, *Islam & Modernity*, 157ff.

⁸⁸ Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'an*, 17.

⁸⁹ Linda Smith and William Raeper, *Ide-ide Filsafat dan Agama Dulu dan Sekarang*, trans. P. Hardono Hadi (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2000), 30-33.

⁹⁰ Rahman, "Ibn Sīnā," 487-488.

philosophers was in between Descartes' and Platonist positions. The argument, which is at the same time a criticism, according to Rahman,⁹¹ can be called an argument obtained from abstraction, in which it abstracts the physical functions of all the functions of an organism. This criticism of the interactionist pattern of dualism also sharply implies that humans are not seen as one individual whole.

Another source of knowledge that Rahman seems not to use but that al-Ghazālī used was intuition. But the use of this intuition was aided by reason. This is possible because in epistemological theory, the function of reason in processing data that has been obtained by intuition and senses cannot be avoided.⁹² Even some scholars have the view that in the context of epistemology, intuitionism is very difficult to accept, although it is also difficult to reject.⁹³ In theology, the reason is always put forward as a source of knowledge, but after some people realize that intuition can also be relied on, especially in producing knowledge in the form of religious experience, intuition is also recognized in theology as a means of obtaining knowledge, although to process it systematically it still relies on the function of reason.⁹⁴ Due to the combination of reason and intuition in producing knowledge, it is not easy to identify the use of this intuition solely in al-Ghazālī's conception of resurrection and this can be done through careful analysis of all his discussions on the topic.

Among the characteristics that stand out for the use of this intuitive potential in the discussion of al-Ghazālī, in

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 488.

⁹² D. S. Adam, "Theology," in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* XII, ed. James Hastings (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, & New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), 293.

⁹³ Jonathan Harrison, "Intuitionism," in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* III, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc. & The Free Press, 1972), 72-74.

⁹⁴ See Adam, "Theology," 294-296.

general, are narration and parables. In the context of resurrection, al-Ghazālī also followed procedures in these two characteristics. When describing the human condition in the *maḥshar*, as will be explained in the next section, al-Ghazālī showed the characteristics of the narrative. Likewise, when explaining the reconciliation of soul and body, al-Ghazālī showed the characteristics of parables. Thus, it can be said that by presenting a discussion full of narratives and parables, he was using his intuition.

Regarding the method, al-Ghazālī and Rahman did not seem to adhere to one method of knowledge only. However, both al-Ghazālī and Rahman had a more inclined method to apply. The method Rahman preferred to apply was philosophical method, that is, by elaborating on the basic ideas of each subject being studied and the study being carried out critically. When discussing the dualism of soul and body, as indicated earlier, he traced the roots of this idea historically to Greek philosophy and then criticized the idea with the repertoire of Greek philosophy itself, namely Descartes' concept of *cogito ergo sum*.

Rahman's discussion through this philosophical method calls for a mentality, way of thinking, and personality that prioritizes intellectual freedom, and is free from dogmatism and fanaticism. As mentioned earlier, Rahman highly appreciated philosophy, but this attitude of respect was not blind, because he opposed pure rational, naked philosophy. Rahman⁹⁵ argued that the truth generated by philosophy is aimed at imaginary symbols, and not in mere naked rational formulas, which are adopted so that they are easily accepted and beneficial to ordinary people. Rahman⁹⁶ showed his disapproval of Aristotle, who viewed humans as rational animals, so that everything was entrusted and submitted according to the

⁹⁵ Rahman, *Islam*, 119.

⁹⁶ Rahman, *Health and Medicine in the Islamic Tradition*, 19.

will of their minds. To show Aristotle's error, Rahman proposed an idea that originated in the Qur'ān, namely that humans are lifted and glorified by their intellect. So, if reason is used for the benefit of animals, humans will become worse than animals. According to Rahman,⁹⁷ it is this situation that is illustrated by the Qur'ān, *Sūrah* 95:4-5, "We created man in the best of molds but then we sent him down to be the lowest of the low...." Thus, this information proves that Rahman's praise for philosophy was still limited because he did not follow his intellectual will in a pure and free manner but was based on the Qur'ān. In this case, the procedure seen from Rahman is the discussion of an idea or thought through a fundamental inquiry and the discussion was carried out critically on conceptions which he deemed to be unfaithful to the Qur'ān.

For this reason, this philosophical method was often juxtaposed by Rahman with the *kalām* method through his exploration of the verses of the Qur'ān. In criticizing the idea of the dualism of soul and body inherited from the Middle Ages, Rahman based his views on the Qur'ān. Among the verses of the Qur'ān quoted were the *Sūrah* 2:247; 58:18-19; 15:29; 38:72; 2:9; and 95:4-5. Standing on the text of the Qur'ān, combined with philosophical reasoning, is evidence that he applied the *kalām* method. In his review of Rahman's *Major Themes of the Quran*, where eschatology is one of the main topics, Welch⁹⁸ concluded that Rahman used both the method of analytic philosophy as well as the method of systematic theology. Meanwhile, Denny⁹⁹ likened Rahman to the two Christian figures, Anselm and Augustine, whose formulations were based on the faith factor.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ Alford T. Welch, "Major Themes of the Qur'an," *The Muslim World* 74 (1984), 120.

⁹⁹ Denny, "Fazlur Rahman: Muslim Intellectual," 91.

As for al-Ghazālī, he was more inclined to apply the *kalām* method. Al-Ghazālī confirmed that *kalām* is based on the Qur'ān, but he also acknowledged that the *kalām* method consists of faith and rationalization tainted by the false syllogisms of philosophy.¹⁰⁰ Al-Ghazālī's description of this was confirmed by later authorities such as al-Shahrastānī, Maimonides, and Ibn Khaldūn.¹⁰¹ The characteristics of the *kalām* that al-Ghazālī applied were dialectical and apologetic by attacking all those who disagreed with him theologically. This is clearly seen when al-Ghazālī attacked the philosophers about their denial of the doctrine of resurrection of body. The characteristic of such *kalām* method is related to the application of the contradiction logic, as previously explained.

The discussion of al-Ghazālī was also pursued using the mystical method. In this method, language is often considered to hinder understanding because knowledge is a form of individual feeling,¹⁰² so this method often communicates its theories through metaphors and parables rather than through definite linguistic mechanisms. The theories can be applied in the form of poetry and stories rather than in the form of honest exposition.¹⁰³ As mentioned earlier, al-Ghazālī presented narratives and parables in his discussion on the resurrection. In the context of the parable, it was found in the explanation, among others, of the re-integration of soul and body in which he likened resurrection of body to the building of a

¹⁰⁰ Al-Ghazālī's description of this was confirmed by later authorities such as al-Shahrastānī, Maimonides, and Ibn Khaldūn. For an analysis of the views on the *kalām* of these three figures, see Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalām* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, & London: Harvard University Press, 1976), 3-58.

¹⁰¹ For an analysis of their views on *kalām*, see *ibid.*

¹⁰² Oliver Leaman, *A Brief Introduction of Islamic Philosophy*, 73; Nuseibeh, "Epistemology," 830.

¹⁰³ Nuseibeh, "Epistemology," 830.

ship from parts of a ship that has been wrecked; the parts of the ship that are no longer used can be rearranged into a new ship.¹⁰⁴ In the context of the narrative is, among others, when he explained human condition in the *maḥshar*.¹⁰⁵ According to Rahman,¹⁰⁶ in presenting such eschatological narratives, al-Ghazālī instilled fear and hope in humans. The illustration is sensual in that resurrection in the hereafter was described as something that is sensually felt and experienced. As for Rahman himself, because he emphasized morality, his discussion would have implications for moral action movements.

Conclusions and Discussion

Comparing the thoughts of the two figures who represent the two climates of Muslim intellectual history, medieval and modern, makes a lot of differences. These differences are not only conceptually but also epistemologically. In explaining the doctrine of resurrection, al-Ghazālī understood that humans consist of two separate substances: soul and body. This understanding was an impact of the tradition that developed in his time which was previously recognized by Muslim philosophers especially al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. The difference was that if the philosophers considered that resurrection occurs only in the soul, then al-Ghazālī considered that it occurs in both soul and body. Meanwhile, Rahman had a completely different understanding from both al-Ghazālī and those philosophers. According to Rahman, the Qurʾān does not recognize an afterlife inhabited by a soul without a body; this Book does not acknowledge the dualism of soul and body. So, although at first glance Rahman seems to support al-Ghazālī, in fact the two are different, because the participation of the body resurrection in Rahman's

¹⁰⁴ Al-Ghazālī, "al-Maḍnūn bih 'alā Ghayr Ahlih," 352.

¹⁰⁵ Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn* IV, 560-561; see also al-Ghazālī, *al-Durrah al-Fākhirah fī Kashf 'Ulūm al-Ākhirah*, 58-63.

¹⁰⁶ Rahman, *Islam*, 110.

conception does not begin with the separation of the body from the soul. Humans are living organisms that are formed from one unit and are fully functional; soul and body are not two separate substances. In this connection, Rahman not only contradicts al-Ghazālī but also shows that al-Ghazālī cannot be separated from the Greek mindset.

Rahman’s view seems to be related to efforts to instil in the Muslim societies that in the world of Islamic education, various concepts that have been taught cannot be separated from philosophy even though the spirit of the teachings criticizes philosophy itself. The content of Islamic education is thus loaded with various traditions that were previously adopted by Muslim scientists in their various streams of scholarship. The sources and methods of knowledge in simple terms can be summarized in the following table:

Elements of Epistemology	Al-Ghazālī	Fazlur Rahman
Sources of knowledge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Apocalyptic texts (the Qur’ān, <i>hadīth</i>) • Reason (philosophy: Aristotelian syllogism, Platonian dualism) • Intuition 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Apocalyptic texts (the Qur’ān) • Reason (philosophy: patterns of Descartes and general philosophical thinking)
Methods of knowledge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Kalām</i> (dialectic and apologetic) • Intuitive (narratives and parables) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Philosophical method (fundamental and critical discussion) • <i>Kalām</i> (dialectic)

Based on the table, the influence of Greek philosophy in the Islamic world is enormous. The influence is not only on philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā and al-Farābī, but also on theologians such as al-Ghazālī. This figure, who has always been regarded by the majority of Muslims as an anti-philosophical theologian, is, in fact, inseparable from philosophy, even in his many works he often used the perspectives of Greek philosophy. In this study, it is found that al-Ghazālī used at least Aristotelian syllogism and the idea of Platonist dualism of soul and body. Al-Ghazālī also often used intuition as seen in his discussion using narratives and parables. Thus, Rahman's criticism of al-Ghazālī and medieval Muslim philosophers was always related to the fact that their conceptions in Rahman's view were often inconsistent with the Qur'ān due to the influence of foreign thought originating from Greek philosophy and other religious doctrines.¹⁰⁷

Al-Ghazālī's discussion on resurrection seems to be in theological-metaphysical study of eschatology, while Rahman's discussion has gone beyond mere theological-metaphysical study towards an ethical-anthropocentric discussion. This is evident from the fact that Rahman often links his discussions with morality. This means that the eschatological doctrines that are conveyed in the Qur'ān do not have to be understood in the context of mere theology and metaphysics, but also that the doctrine contains commands to do good. In other words, the emergence of the idea of eschatology in the Qur'ān is intended as a guide for humans to uphold morality. Those who succeed in upholding morality will have heaven provided for them. On the other hand, for those who do not succeed, hell will be provided. Therefore, if morality is the foundation of Rahman's resurrection thought or in general eschatology, then long debates about speculative metaphysical concepts are not so important. This is

¹⁰⁷ Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'an*, 17.

because whatever conception is believed is all aimed at upholding morality. For this reason, it becomes logical when Rahman¹⁰⁸ argues that compared to intellectuals, the Qur'ān values morality more, and it is very appropriate to teach in education.

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¹⁰⁸ Fazlur Rahman, *The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), 258.

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