

THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF RUSSIA'S POLITIC AND THE LIMITATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPE'S POLITIC

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Abstract

The purpose of this topic is to discuss the massive limitations of Pro-Western policies based on the impacts of Ukraine crisis and Crimea annexation. The international orders that existed nowadays, such as the UN Charter, NATO Articles, and EU policies, are purposely set-up to promote global peace and harmony in our world order. However, the impact of the Ukraine crisis is contrary to the intention of international orders, as the reality in Europe. The scope of this study is restricted to the NATO policies, EU policies, and the introduction of the UN Charter. Content analysis is the methodology to identify three sections for this study. This study is divided into three sections, i.e. the limitation of the Western policy in the Ukraine conflict, the weakness of NATO military power, and the failure of Pro-Western policies in the case of Ukraine crisis. The sections were analysed by the Neoclassical realism approach to ascertain the irrelevance of the international orders within the parameters of the UN Charter, NATO Articles, and EU policies. Limitations of Pro-Western policies in the case of the Ukraine crisis is unprecedented for the application of Neoclassical realism; hence, reasonably understanding the situation of the Ukraine crisis is the primary application of this study.

Keywords: Pro-western Policy, Neo-classical Realism, NATO

Introduction

The Weaknesses of Pro-Western Policy

In this topic, the Pro-Western policies could be observed through the UN Charter. Unfortunately, the UN Charter could not interfere in international security or help to avoid the conflicts between Eastern and Western Europe. Specific weaknesses of the UN Charter could be identified by monitoring the case of the Ukraine Crisis in 2014. Referring to the UN Charter on the title of the Security Council under chapter 5, article 23, section 1,

the Security Council shall consist of eleven Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect six other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organisation, and also to equitable geographical distribution (Charter of the United Nations, 1945, p. 06).

The UN Charter could not fulfil the objective to maintain peace and global security based on the case of the Ukraine Crisis. Although the US, Russia, UK, and France are permanent members of the UN, each country has its interest in the international arena. The US, France, and the UK are tied to NATO memberships, causing Russia to be aware of NATO as a long-term threat in terms of NATO enlargement towards Eastern Europe. If we observe the UN Charter on chapter 12, the title of International Trusteeship System, article 76, the primary objectives of the trusteeship system on section A are “to further international peace and security and section” and section D, “to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United

Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives” (Charter of the United Nations, 1945, p. 15). The members of UN imposed economic sanction on Ukraine due to the crisis that includes military intervention from Russia because Ukraine still maintained the status of Russia in the UN. The UN's trusteeship system has no practical way to maintain peace in continental Europe. Chapter 8 of the UN Charter with the title “Regional Arrangements”, article 52, section 2, indicates the statement,

the Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council (Charter of the United Nations, 1945, p. 11).

Crimea was annexed to Russia without the permission of the UN, including the Security Council. Although Russia is one of the members of the UN, it did not abide by the charter in the case of the Ukraine crisis. This case has no realistic obligation to prove that the UN members fully obey the charter, and it does not realistically reflect the actions of the UN members to defy the aggressiveness of Russia invasion in Ukraine.

Referring to the UN General Assembly Declaration on October 24, 1970, the principles of international law were declared entitled “1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States under the Charter of the United Nations (GAR 2625)”. These declared principles are;

(1) the principle that states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations; (2) The principle that states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in

such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered; (3) The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, in accordance with the Charter; (4) The duty of states to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter; (5) The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; (6) The principle of sovereign equality of states; and (7) the principle that states shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter (Centre For International Law, 1970, pp. 04-08).

Unfortunately, although the declaration on principles of the international law by the UN General Assembly Resolution is used as a former guideline to enlighten the myth of international order, it is not a realistic pathway for the international order, which could be observed and learned by the case of the Ukraine crisis and annexation of Crimea as political divisions between the Eastern and Western Europe. These two cases had indicated and demonstrated the weaknesses of the Pro-Western policy defined by the UN Charter.

The UN Charter could not bring peace and security in Ukraine by the UN members as well as the specific charters did not influence the EU and NATO members in the manners to maintain equal peace and security in continental Europe. Ironically, the UN, NATO, and the EU were not reliable to assist or neutralise the political and military conflicts between the Eastern and Western Europe concerning the Ukraine crisis and Crimea annexation in 2014. The UN, NATO, and the EU's principles are just specific visions to propose peaceful international communities. However, the missions cannot be realistically deployed and operated to fulfil the visions, which could be observed in the case of the Ukraine crisis and the Crimea annexation. This study discusses the weaknesses of the Pro-Western policies with the UN, EU, and NATO organisations by the reflections of the Ukraine crisis and Crimea annexation through three defined parts of the study. The first part includes the limitation of western policy in the Ukraine conflict, while the second part highlights the weaknesses of NATO

military power, and the final part is the failure of Pro-Western policies in the case of the Ukraine crisis. These three sections had been analysed by the technique of contents analysis, as well as linkage to the assumptions of the Neoclassical realism approach.

The Limitation of Western Policy in the Ukraine Conflict

The Euromaidan Evolution is the case to identify the limitation of western policy to influence Ukraine directly. In addition, the intervention of the Russian invasion in Ukraine is the demonstration to dispose of many weaknesses of the western policies. The western policies failed to neutralise the Ukrainian conflicts. The reason is the fact that defined by Freedman, "the West's response was generally cautious, too cautious for some. President Obama was accused of failing to appreciate the developing logic of President Putin's authoritarianism and his assertiveness both at home and in Russia's near abroad" (Freedman, 2019, p. 100). Freedman's statement depicts the Neoclassical realism assumption, whereby the decision-makers of Russia consider the US as an adversary, derived from foreign policy choice against the US administration. Additionally, western policies provide "economic sanctions faced opposition, especially in those European countries that had substantial trading relationships with Russia" (Freedman, 2019, p. 106) because the domestic actors in Western Europe could disturb the style or timing of economic sanctions based on trading policies with Russia, to respond to the Ukraine crisis as international challenge, referring to the Neoclassical realism approach. Meanwhile, Marples stated that

the Euromaidan Evolution [is] divided [in] two directions. One of the directions [is to] demand the government [to] return to its Pro-Western direction whereas [the other] direction [is] focused on [the] removal of the president and his closet associates such Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, who has now stepped down (Marples, 2017, p. 30).

In accordance to the statement of Marples, Neoclassical realists identified the domestic actors in Ukraine as not only

affecting the style and timing of national policies, they also affect international challenges, herein, the case related to the existence of Ukrainian policies either to obey the western policies or Russian policies based on the case of the Ukraine crisis in 2014. The internal conflicts “such as the beatings, shooting, and the law of January 16, 2014, that have catalysed the anger and motivations of those at the barricades” (Marples, 2017, p. 30) could not be curbed by the western policy. Given the Neoclassical realism, the reason of protesting ideology to overthrow the existing government in Ukraine inhibits the EU leaders from extracting and mobilising their resources due to the publicly common ideas of the Ukrainians to overthrow the leadership of Yanukovich as the proper role for Ukraine and its economy. Similarly, Pleshakov also emphasized that

Ukraine is a divided nation, but its divisions are more intricate than the Pro-European and the Pro-Russian. Every conflict on its territory involves numerous regional agents, conflated and fluid local identities make Ukraine’s territorial integrity frail. In foreign policy, this makes it a swing state. Domestically, the power of regional actors undercuts the authority of the central government in the Kiev (Pleshakov, 2017, p. 19).

The statements of Pleshakov had certain ideas associated with the Neoclassical realism, the ideology of Pro-Western policy that had facilitated and inhibited the Ukraine leaders from extracting and mobilising national resources depending on the social requirements for a series of proper arrangement to benefit Ukraine and its economy. Again, the Pro-European policy and Pro-Russian policy as international challenges had influenced the national policies of Ukraine to respond to it by Ukraine’s actors. Consequently, the Ukraine crisis and annexation of Crimea are the facts to illustrate the limitation of Pro-Western policy and its power politics. “From the other direction the west was criticized for failing to pay adequate attention to the full implications of what was going on in Kiev in February 2014 and supporting what was in the end, an anti-democratic seizure of power” (Freedman, 2019, p.

100). Given Neoclassical realism, Freedman's statement can be defined as the western leaders attempt to maximise their powers by differently deciding Ukraine beyond the goal of national survival. Further estimation of the limitation of western policy in the case of the Ukraine conflict can be observed in some oligarchs who utilised their powers within the protest issue purposely to protect their wealth, including the Rinat Akhmetov and Dmytro Firtash. For some protestors, the barricades are another issue related to the low paying job, but the key problem is the corruption and inequality of living standard after the independence of Ukraine in 1991 (Marples, 2017, p. 30). The corruption and inequality of the living standards in Ukraine are the obstacles that led the western power to have no direct solution to dissolve the problems. More attention on the limitation of western Europe's politics via the statement of Marples can be observed in the statement,

the protests were how less about the EU and more about the future of Ukraine. More attention was paid to the innate and grotesque corruption of the ruling regime, of the prevalence of oligarchs who had enriched themselves at the expense of the state, of the lack of legal reforms. These protests had two immediate results. One was the agreement of Yanukovich to sacrifice his Prime Minister, Mykola Azarov, who tried to make a compromise with opposition leaders (Marples, 2017, p. 43).

Referring to Marples's statements above, the conflict between the protesters and former politicians in Ukraine had changed the style of national policy (conflict policy) in divergently classified societies of Ukraine, and also changed the political relationship between the EU and Ukraine on the international level, defined by the Neoclassical realism approach. Overall speaking, the statement by Pleshakov, transition to sovereignty can be relatively smooth only when the birth of a nation-state is preceded by the emergence of a nation. That was certainly not the case with Ukraine. A state but not yet a nation, Ukraine struggles like a forced bulb. In this condition, encouraging it to choose between Russia and Europe means exerting too much pressure on the fragile

domestic balance. In 2013–2016, that pressure brought unendurable distress (Pleshakov, 2017, p. 19).

is similar to the assumptions of Neoclassical realism approach. It highlighted that the domestic actors in Ukraine had affected the nature of internal policy by responding to the external policies such as the Pro-Western policy and the Pro-Russia policy between 2013 and 2016, and the mixed ideologies (Pro-Western policy and the Pro-Russia policy) facilitated and influenced leaders in Ukraine based on the contents of ideologies and publicly common ideas to decide the proper role of Ukraine and its economy.

During the presidency of Yanukovych in Ukraine, he was considered as his party's favourite as well as the supporters in eastern Ukraine to retain his political career. Although the eastern region supported Yanukovych, the issue to sign the Association Agreement (AA) caused him to lose his party and supporters, especially those communists who preferably integrate with Russia to make him withdraw the AA agreement (Marples, 2017, pp. 23–24; Walker, 2015, p. 144). Given the Neoclassical realism approach, the Ukraine policies were affected by Yanukovych's party to ignore or distort the real international circumstance, denying to sign the AA agreement with the Pro-Western policy.

A deal on pre-term elections agreed with the EU negotiation on 21 February 2014 would have allowed Yanukovych to stay in power in the interim, and Putin was furious at the perceived bad faith of the west in not upholding the deal (Sakwa, 2017, p. 155).

Hence, the ideology of signing AA agreement inhibited Yanukovych's efforts to extract and mobilise internal resources in Ukraine depending on the extents of Putin's power, EU engagement, and internal societies regarding the proper role and its economy for Ukraine as what Neoclassical realists believed. Additionally, although human rights are the western policy in Europe, it failed to control the situation in Ukraine. The resignation of Yanukovych and his cabinet of ministers should be punished by

justice based on his cruel actions against his people upon the use of gunfire, kidnapping, and violence in the case of Ukraine conflict and more seriously to provide opportunities for the protestor's demand (Marples, 2017, p. 31). Unfortunately, Yanukovych's human rights policy is irrelevant to the EU policy. He ordered troops to use live ammunition against protestors until he lost his majority support in the parliament as well as letting oppositional parties overthrow his regime (Marples, 2017, p. 37). These are what the Neoclassical realists say as "[the] state leader [who seeks] to maximize his power is likely to make [different] decision than ... [to pursue] the more modest goal of national survival" (Fordham, 2009, p. 254) as well as the policies that affect both existing style and timing of national policies and the EU policies. Moreover, the AA agreement "was far more than an economic and technical agreement, but also covered military security issue and in the short-term offered little in the way of economic support" (Sakwa, 2017, p. 152). In the viewpoint of Neoclassical realism on Sakwa's statement, the innovative AA agreement was countered by leading western states to provide limited incentives for Ukraine due to the competitive nature of the international system in the world. The truth is that the existence of EU policy does not prove as the realistic policy for all nations in continental Europe, such as the case of Ukraine conflict. Due to the escalation of protests and the failure of the government against the protesters regarding the postponement of the AA signing issue, the public had the wrong perception on the authority of Mykola Azarov as the former prime minister who, despite being the first to lose his politics power in the Donetsk-based cabinet, in truth, was still in authority (Marples, 2017, p. 26). For the modest goal of state survival as the Neoclassical realism approach, Mr. Azarov, as the leader, made different decisions conversely to the former government to maximise his power purposely to retain his authority. However, the authority of Azarov did not reign long due to fewer delegates in the former parliament. Marples states that

the [opposite] sides that they can effect change through parliament. They do not have sufficient delegates. It is uncertain whether a call for a general strike would meet

with approval, particularly in the eastern industrial regions, where there is much, justifiable fear over what a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU would bring in Ukraine (Marples, 2017, pp. 26–27).

Those domestic actors already affect the current style and timing of national policy to sign the AA agreement as well as affecting the nature of international response related to the policy of EU based on the assumption of Neoclassical realism approach. EU initiative policies that were launched in 2009 had no prospect of future membership; therefore, derided as enlargement-lite by certain western scholars (Kuzio, 2015, p. 111) considering the ability of domestic actors of EU members to affect foreign policies related to membership of Eastern Europe to respond to international challenges. Referring to Marples's statement on the issue of the eastern trend,

opinion polls that show the east and south opposed to the protests become irrelevant when a focused and determined minority decides to choose its own fate and not wait for the elected government or opposition. But now surely is the time for the latter to take the initiative to outline its demands and decide on a single leader to face Yanukovych or his Region Party successor in early presidential elections. If it does not manage to lead and control the result could be chaos and further bloodshed in the streets (Marples, 2017, p. 31)

due to the unwillingness of eastern society to accept the western policy, as well as the threat imposed by western policy concerning their interests in eastern Ukraine. The confrontations between the eastern and western society already affected various decisions in terms of styles and timings on national policies as explained by Neoclassical realism. As an aftermath of the brutal acts imposed by the government, the rise of local leaders against the government was observed, as in the case of Chechnya President Ramzan Kadyrov because the citizens of Ukraine believed their country was disintegrating due to territory integrity for over twenty-three

years (Marples, 2017, p. 57). The disintegrated situation in eastern Ukraine could be viewed on the case of Donetsk-based regime as a removal of Ukraine legacy in 1991, defined by the scholar, Marples, as “no means clear that the interim government could offer unity and compromise. The financial crisis in mid-April is much worse than was the case in late November. Ukraine badly needs help today as it mourns its victims” (Marples, 2017, p. 45). In the case of Donetsk-based regime that matched the Neoclassical realism’s explanation, domestic actors in eastern Ukraine has no will to obey the former Ukrainian government, which was transformed into a disintegrated country that affects the style of national policies irrelevantly with their existing policies. In terms of coal generation in eastern Ukraine, the failure to cooperate between Ukraine and EU had led the coal business to decline dramatically from January through April 2014, as statistically illustrated by “0.4% at 27.87 million tons, signifying a potential annual output of around 83 million tons” due to the confrontation between local government and those separatists (Marples, 2017, p. 54). Unfortunately, Pro-Western policy did not prove any efficiency in the case of Ukraine crisis based on the internal chaos, as well as the broken western style of human rights in Ukraine. Domestically, the Ukrainian government and those separatists had ignored or distorted the objectives of the international circumstance such as the Pro-Western policy and Pro-Russian policy that is directly affecting the Ukrainian policy as explained by the Neoclassical realism approach. Finally, the failure of the Minsk agreement to ensure stabilisation of eastern conflict in Ukraine could be referred to the Foerster’s statement,

France and Germany were intent on finding an elusive diplomatic solution and were unwilling to send either arms or substantial economic assistance, and the UK and US were ambivalent about both including the military resistance to authorize the law of Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (Foerster, 2017, p. 56).

Leaders of France, Germany, the UK, and the US might consider their national securities to mobilise and maintain their strategies in

the Ukrainian region to objectively foreclose alliance opportunities as the assumption of Neoclassical realism approach.

To view the situation in western Ukraine through the case of Ukraine conflict, we have no clear idea as how to measure the western policy either as a desire to be a part of Europe or a wish to remove the current government because the western policy has no real actions to decide the fate of Ukraine based on the cruel events such as shooting, kidnapping and others against local people as instructed by the Yanukovych leadership (Marple, 2017, p. 34). Referring to the Neoclassical realism approach, Yanukovych leadership had affected the internal policies in Ukraine with his brutal policy against civilians, as well as the international policy in terms of delaying to sign the AA agreement with Western Europe. Diversified protests in Kiev could not be settled by the Pro-Western policy, including official government during the Euromaidan revolution. The Neoclassical realist approach was assumed to define those domestic actors in Ukraine that affected both the styles and timings of national and international policies. It could be observed by Fomina's statement,

Ukrainian NGO's, as well as unaffiliated activities, organized protests in front of the Russian embassy as well as rallies and public events in support of the pro-democratic civic opposition in Ukraine. These events gathered rank and file Ukrainian workers, students, settled Ukrainian minority in Poland, as well as many Poles, including politicians and other well-known public figures. A civic committee for solidarity with Ukraine united outstanding Polish public figures, including some representatives of the Ukrainian minority in Poland as well as settled Ukrainians (Fomina, 2017, p. 86).

In fact, from November 2013 to the end of February 2014, protestors gathered on the Kiev's central square, in a series of demonstrations known as the Euromaidan. This protest has involved several distinct stages, culminating in what some analysts have called a national revolution that

removed the government and presidency of Yanukovych (Marples, 2017, p. 41).

The leadership removal ideology in Kiev can impede the leader, as Yanukovych's efforts to extract and mobilise national resources (either approaching the Pro-Western policy or Pro-Russian policy) for the proper roles of Ukraine and the economy based on the publicly common ideas such as a series of demonstration in Kiev central square, which is similar to the Neoclassical realism approach. This Euromaidan protest was not only involved by students, but also protestors from the age range of 30-40 years old as they were not prepared to compromise with western Ukraine where the local regions no longer deal with the government of Yanukovych, but established their rules instead (Marples, 2017, p. 43). According to the Neoclassical realists, the act of the domestic actors had affected both local policy styles in Ukraine and international policy styles, especially the EU policies, despite their age differences. The younger generation prefers the EU policy, as opposed to the older generation (those over the age of 55) whose views represent over 28 per cent of Ukraine population in 2012 (Marples, 2017, p. 23). The domestic actors between younger and older generations affected the decision of the Ukraine government to sign the AA agreement, which directly affected the integration of continental Europe through the existing of EU policy. This is the point that capably explained by the Neoclassical realism assumption. As emphasized by Marples regarding the Neoclassical realism approach, the EU policy might not attract the older generation in Ukraine. The polarised situation happened because both sides exhibited different characters and personnel, whereby the government has a various gang of thugs that spread from the city of Kiev to the principals of Kharkiv and Donetsk. At the same time, several local militias were formed on the opposite sides, such as the Pravyi Sector, i.e. the rightist group and Batkivshchyna as a self-defence group (Marples, 2017, p. 43). The internal conflicts in Ukraine do not conform to the western policy, such as the EU and UN policies. It means that the Pro-Western policy is not effective in assisting Ukraine. Consequently, the

Ukrainian government that governed by Yanukovych and Interior Minister Vitalii Zakharenko bear the main responsibility, ordered troops to fire on protesters by using live ammunition, situating snipers on rooftops who picked off targets at will. The government had begun to slaughter its own people. It was the moment of no return. The numbers of dead approached 100, hundreds more were wounded, many severely. But the assault, remarkably, failed and the protesters remained in place (Marples, 2017, p. 44).

Again here, the statement of Marples could be explained by the Neoclassical realism approach where the leaders such as Yanukovych and Zakharenko brutally launched military forces against internal protesters as different decision to pave their ways to maximise their powers without considering the national survival. In addition, the mindsets of both leaders extracted and mobilised national resources based on their extents of ideologies to consider supportive governmental ideas as the proper roles for Ukraine. After the resignation of Yanukovych, finally, “negotiations in the Minsk, under the auspices of the OSCE, resulted in a shaky ceasefire on 26 August, but agreement on a permanent solution remained out of reach” (Rutland, 2015, p. 131) during Poroshenko presidency to prove certain limitations of Pro-Western policies to influence Eastern Europe. In terms of the Neoclassical realism approach, the ideology of Minsk agreement also inhibits leaders from mobilising and extracting resources depending on the contents of Minsk agreement and the leadership, which is irrelevant in Eastern Europe occupied by separatists for a proper role in Eastern Europe and its economy. Additionally, a western policy such as NATO’s Article 4 does not carry the reality of collective security guarantees for the NATO partners in terms of Partnership for Peace (PfP; Moore, 2017, p. 168). Moore’s statement is able to explain by the Neoclassical realism, the ideology of PfP inhibiting leaders of NATO to extract and mobilise resources depending on the ideology of PfP as a publicly common idea for proper role in the states, including Ukraine as well as a

selection of foreign policies is a choice for states within NATO members. The following part explains the limitations of NATO through the contents of the weakness of NATO military power.

The Weakness of NATO Military Power

The weakness of NATO expansion to influence the internal politics in Ukraine as well as the interest of Eastern Europe could be traced back to the statement of Herpen and the definition by Walker,

the weak reaction of most European government and politicians, which oscillate between appeasement and open support for the Russia. This appeasement did not start in August, but can be traced back to the Bucharest NATO summit of April in 2008, when the France and the Germany blocked the Membership Action Plan for the Georgia and the Ukraine, which was a signal to the Moscow to accelerate its aggressive policy towards both countries as proven statements to demonstrate the limitation of NATO policy to deter Eastern Europe (Herpen, 2014, p. 247; Walker, 2015, p. 141).

To understand the above statements contributed by Herpen and Walker through the Neoclassical realism assumption, the obstacle in mobilisation was high in Russia and the country had faced a low level of external vulnerability in 2008 but leaders like Putin still fear a new long-term threat in the future. Thus, a series of military employment in Ukraine is the fact to defy NATO enlargement in Eastern Europe. In addition, Russia's military employment also proved that the state leader, Putin, attempts to maximise his power using different ways to weaken the state of Ukraine, as well as military employment against NATO's power. However, he does not consider deeply for Russia's survival. It proved the assumption of Neoclassical realism. According to Kuzio (2015), "in April 2008, Putin told the NATO-Russia Council at the Bucharest NATO Summit that Ukraine was a fragile and artificial state, warning it would disintegrate if it joined

NATO” (p. 110). Putin’s decision is similar to the Neoclassical realist’s viewpoint that state leaders attempt to maximise their power based on different decisions, but not necessarily as a goal of national survival for Ukraine. Additionally, the Membership Action Plan (MAP) created by the NATO members were also internally opposed by Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, due to “fear of a Russia backlash and lack of substantive reform in Ukraine” (Wolff, 2017, p. 74) because the domestic actors within NATO members could affect NATO policies, including styles, timings, and nature of responses to respond to the challenge of Russia backlash, referring to the Neoclassical realism approach. The deterrence between Russia and NATO makes it hard to achieve the goal due to the weaponry business relationship between France (one of the NATO members) and Russia, established since 2008. The weaponry business relationship involved one-billion Euro sales between the NATO countries and Russia but it was warned by the US on December 18, 2009, to prevent the military power of Russia against NATO in the future based on the failure of ceasefire commitments to retreat from Georgia and Moldovan (Herpen, 2014, p. 248). However, the business had been diplomatically established between NATO countries and Russia, making it difficult for NATO to launch military power against Russia through an economic interest in terms of military business. From the Neoclassical realist’s viewpoint, the competitive nature of the international system provides incentives for Russia to emulate politic, military, and technological practice in France successfully. Referring to the 2010 Lisbon and 2012 Chicago Summit, NATO offered no initiative to promote military integration or political reform based on specific causes, such as the anti-enlargement Victor Yanukovych as the Ukrainian leader in 2010, hostility of Russia against the NATO enlargement, and the condemnation of western support for the Ukraine (Wolff, 2017, p. 74). NATO offered no military integration in Ukraine as stated by Fordham “state decision-makers consider both domestic and international friends and adversaries when making foreign policy choices” (Fordham, 2009, p. 253) as one of the Neoclassical realism assumptions.

NATO leader, the US, made a wrong political direction after the military withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama, the ex-president of the US, was more focused on internal affairs without concerning Europe policies, which downplayed the importance of NATO (Herpen, 2014, p. 251). The statement of Herpen indicated the weakness of US policies to avoid confrontation in Russia, especially regarding the Ukraine crisis. As indicated by the Neoclassical realism assumption, US distorted international circumstance in the Ukraine crisis due to the decision of shifted policy in the US. Herpen's statement also indicated the assumption of Neoclassical realism, as the ignorance of Europe policy from the US was based on certain political actors and policy-makers in the US. However, their final decision choices depended on bargaining among relevant politicians and institutions, including NATO. Unfortunately, they did not realise the aggressiveness of Russia's policy. Meanwhile, NATO military power has limited enlargement that could be referred to Wolff's statement, "NATO's current position is to delay any discussion of Ukrainian membership until Ukraine demonstrates tangible progress in its military and political reforms and solves its security problems in the Crimea and the Donbas region" (Wolff, 2017, p. 75). Because NATO considers the mobilisation and maintaining of broad strategies in Europe as national security, NATO leaders might rationally think Ukraine's ideologies that foreclose alliance opportunities as the fact of Neoclassical realism existence. Consequently,

NATO allies have provided only non-lethal security assistance to the Ukraine, despite appeals for the lethal military aid from the Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko, as well as the NATO commander, Gen. Philip Breedlove and the former NATO commander Adm. James Stavridis, among others (Moore, 2017, p. 180).

Additionally, NATO's PfP plan is not compliant and expected through the Ukraine crisis due to its "limited security guarantees for states not included in the collective [defence] mechanism" (Ivanov, 2017, p. 136). Referring to the Neoclassical

realism assumption, the competitive nature of the international system provides restricted incentives for Ukraine due to individual leading states, including NATO members to counter political, military and technological practices in Ukraine through innovation by the NATO's plan or strategy. The facts concerning the Ukraine crisis and the Crimea annexation are reflected in Kalb's questions, "So what would the NATO do? What would the US do? If they did little to nothing, what would be the value of NATO? NATO, in fact, would be seen as toothless and irrelevant, and the US would be seen as a pitiful, helpless giant" (Kalb, 2015, p. 169). NATO, led by the US, feared Russia's political powers in terms of aggressive occupation of the Crimea territory, interference of the sovereignty of Ukraine, and illegal weaponry supplement in Eastern Ukraine. Kalb's questions also incorporate the Neoclassical realism approach, whereby both the US and NATO affected specific policies to either ignore or distort the objectives of international circumstances such as the deterrence between Western Europe and Eastern Europe. Neoclassical realism is a useful tool to explain foreign policy choices of states, which is suitable in explaining the decisive policies of the US and NATO.

The Failure of Pro-Western Policies in the Case of Ukraine Crisis

The Budapest Declaration in 1994 signed by Russia, the UK, and the US related to the UN Charter, OSCE, or NATO partnership contained no assurance for Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea with Russia (Foerster, 2017, p. 56; Freedman, 2019, p. 101) because Neo-realists consider the decision-makers among Russia, the UK, and the US might consider their national securities to mobilise and maintain supported strategies differently in Ukraine as the appearance of aggressiveness foreclose the alliance opportunities in the case of Ukraine crisis. The issue of Deep and Comprehensive free trade Agreement (DCFTA) before the signing of AA on March 30, 2012, can be traced back, where the EU launched a serial policy for the improvement of the legal juridical system, prison confinement, election laws, and the releasing issue of former Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, due to the lapse on selective justice during her presidency in Ukraine as delaying

causes to sign the AA agreement (Marples, 2017, p. 14; Herpen, 2014, p. 243). This statement proves that EU politics interfered with the sovereignty of Ukraine before the issue of signing AA in 2013. It seems that the above statements of Marples and Herpen are similar to the Neoclassical realism assumption, where the EU leaders might enhance their powers with alternative decisions such as improvement of legal juridical system, prison confinement, election laws and the releasing issue of the ex-former Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko that were not considered survival of entire continental Europe. "Russia and the Atlantic powers entered into an intense security competition in the Caucasus and the Ukraine" that hardly "to understand how what was in essence not much more than a technical agreement between the Ukraine and the EU escalated into crisis" (Sakwa, 2017, p. 152) because both sides of decision-makers between the Russia and Atlantic states consider international adversaries based on security policy choices for Ukraine as the Neoclassical realists believed. "After Yanukovych won election to the presidency in February 2010, he moved quickly to centralise political power and bring Ukraine back into Moscow's orbit" (Rutland, 2015, p. 128) as the planned intention to disobey Pro-Western policies offered by EU. Yanukovych, the Neoclassical realist who intends to enhance his power, might consider his or the Ukraine interest more than national survival. In the year of 2013, the signing AA issue had been postponed. This is another failure of the EU to attract Ukraine into joining the EU policies. The EU had no idea to provide realistic opinions for the internal political problems in Ukraine during the presidency of Yanukovych. In explaining the statement of Herpen by the Neoclassical realism assumption, a series of proposed juridical systems from the EU organisation were ignored, and the objectives of international circumstances were distorted, such as the existing Ukraine situation and its relationship with Russia.

Meanwhile, those domestic political actors and policy-makers in the organisation of EU preferred to involve their initial policy-making process for Ukraine. Still, the final policy choice depended on the relevant political actors and institutions between EU and Ukraine, where EU did not realise that the policy choice

had provoked Russia causing military intervention in the case of Ukraine crisis in 2014. “The political association agreement with the EU was signed on 21 March 2014, and the economic chapters on 21 June but [the] implementation of the economic dimension was postponed for a year as an incentive to Russia to help bring peace to East Ukraine” (Rutland, 2015, p. 131). To explain Rutland’s indication by the Neoclassical realism, internal actors in the EU members can alter political and economic agreement to delay its implementation to respond to international challenges related to the Russian intervention in Ukraine. Yanukovich had lost his support in the regions of East and West because he was unable to resolve the economic difficulties and failed to fulfil the election promise.

Furthermore, his ideology was supported by the communist and the UDAR, which are not relevant to the policy of EU, leading to political division, violence on the streets of Kiev, the flight of Yanukovich, and chaos in Ukraine (Marples, 2017, p. 15; Walker, 2015, p. 144). The economic difficulties in Ukraine have been declining since its independence in 1991. It means that wherever the ways the EU is involved or engaged, the economic sphere in Ukraine might hardly improve. Referring to the statement of Marples,

Ukraine’s economic situation is very difficult. One can begin with the catastrophic decline in population since independence from 52.5 to the present 44.5 million, a drop of over 15% in 22 years. Its GDP fell by 1.3% in the second quarter of 2013, though over the entire year a modest growth of 0.5% is anticipated (Marples, 2017, p. 15).

Given the Neoclassical realism assumption to explain both statements of Marples, the belief of an economic declination is publicly held by the civilians who were inhibited by Yanukovich’s efforts to extract and mobilise national resources because they believed that the current leader was unable to flourish the economic sphere in Ukraine.

The EU agreement is not a long-term solution in continental Europe, including the internal affairs in Ukraine. Despite the world politics being realistic and self-protecting, it cannot be resolved by agreements. The failure of launching agreement can be observed through the case of the Ukraine conflict,

the agreement with the EU is simply a business solution that will keep the Russian oligarchs out of their domain. In turn, the Ukrainian opposition perceives its task as supporting what it terms the criminal government in its path towards the Europe before defeating it in the elections. Implicitly, the EU is for the moment at least enhancing the re-election chances of the regional leader simply by dealing with him (Marples, 2017, p. 19).

Marples's statement is similar to the assumption of Neoclassical realism, where the Ukrainian opposition parties could affect the national policy and its relationship with the EU by the case of signing the AA agreement as an international response. Yanukovych's identity was linked with his Donetsk background to support and work with Russian demands and Crimean as well as giving "free rein to Russia's intelligence services in Crimea" (Kuzio, 2015, p. 111). The acts of Yanukovych to support Russia and Crimea are similar to the Neoclassical realism assumption, "opportunistic expansion has always been a core principle of the realist state due to anarchy and uncertainty about other state's intentions create an irreducible level of fear among states that leads to power maximizing [behaviour]" (Schweller, 2009, p. 231). Moreover, the NATO policy also has its weakness, especially weaponry trade involving the EU members in continental Europe, as according to Sloan "the intervening years since the end of Cold War did not prepare the Allies for this shock to the system as they had largely avoided talking about threats except to observe that the Cold War one had passed" (Sloan, 2017, p. 245) as the failed solution to treat the Ukraine crisis. Sloan's statement is similar to the Neoclassical realists who believe that the NATO interest and its institution affected specific policies internally are due to its imperfect delivering restriction by objectively ignoring or

distorting international circumstance as a threat after the Cold War period. It might be correctly stated by Marples, where the free trade interconnection between the EU and Ukraine might gain benefits through the construction of the AA policy, which will decline the dependence of oil and gas from Russia (Marples, 2017, p. 18). However, the fact was that the postponement to sign the AA during the Yanukovich presidency led to the aftermath of internal conflict and political division happening in Ukraine. The perception of Yanukovich already impeded his will to extract and mobilise national resources by neither signing the AA immediately nor joining Russia's policy based on his extents of opinion with national interest about the proper role of Ukraine and its economy, indicating the assumption of Neoclassical realism. In addition, the EU's ignorance and patience behaviour motivated the slow progress of internal decision without meaningful reform in the Ukrainian parliament and cabinet to deal with the AA policy (Marples, 2017, pp. 18–19). Regarding the Neoclassical realism approach, foreign policy choice influenced the EU's initial decision considering Ukraine as an acquaintance by the AA agreement. However, the case of AA postponement would initiate adversary effects on the friendship based on the internal conflict in Ukraine.

The reflection of the Ukraine crisis and its conflict had demonstrated specific weaknesses of the US policies. The hegemonic power is the question mark in the case of the Ukraine crisis. It seems that the US feared Russia aggression to defy NATO and the EU's policies in Eastern Europe. Regarding the trend of western leaders trend in the case of Ukraine crisis, narrowing down to the focusing of leadership in the US, Marples stated "Senator John McClain does not represent Barrack Obama. In fact, he is a loose cannon, known for his savage attacks on authoritarian governments but not for bringing about their removal" (Marples, 2017, p. 26). The US distorts the objective to remove the authoritarian government by affecting national policy in Ukraine as the reason to match with the Neoclassical realism assumption. Additionally, Pro-Western policy such as the "renewed NATO commitment to use partnership concept beyond the NATO's current status to keep open door for the Ukraine including Georgia

and potential new members” as the negative impact to erupt the internal conflict in Ukraine and the deterrence of Russia intervention (Moore, 217, p. 185) because those decision-makers among the NATO members and Russia could consider both domestic and international friendship or adversaries when making foreign policy choices, as well as altering styles or timing of policies by domestic actors in Ukraine naturally to respond to NATO partnership concept, as assumed by the Neoclassical realism approach. A reasonable statement was declared by Herpen,

Obama's oversized self-confidence in the field of foreign affairs. Improvisational was still a friendly characterization because the Obama administration took from the beginning the wrong approach toward the Russia. Instead of taking a tough stance after the Russian invasion and dismemberment of Georgia, Obama started a reset, which transmitted the implicit message that the US would not sanction further Russian aggression (Herpen, 2014, p. 252).

but he simply shifted the foreign policy from Europe to Asia called the 'Asian Pivot' (Herpen, 2014, p. 253), which had less military assistance in Europe (Herpen, 2014, p. 258). Herpen's statements can be explained by the Neoclassical realism, with Obama as the state decision-maker in the US who agreed on the friendship with Russia in terms of diplomatic relationship through foreign policy choice decided by Obama. Moreover, Obama's decision to shift the military, foreign policy from Europe to Asia as the Neoclassical realism's viewpoint defined Obama as a state leader who sought and maximised his power to make a different decision without considering the direct point for the US and Europe survivals. According to the Polish expert, Jadwiga Kiwerska,

Obama's confidential conversation with Medvedev at the end of March 2012, in which the US president was reported to have said in an undertone that after winning re-election, he will have more room for [manoeuvre] as concerns the missile shield, was alarming for the Poles. The credibility of Obama, who purportedly hides his real intentions before

the allies and reveals them to the Russia was put into question. Obama was clearly more focused on establishing good relations with the Kremlin than with the new NATO members (Herpen, 2014, p. 253).

The fact to prove Obama's administration was more focused on the diplomatic relations between the US and Russia is communicated by Herpen,

Poland annexed the solidarity of NATO membership, Obama provided weak response, he announced the imposition of unacceptable costs on the Russia if it continued its aggression, which seemed to imply that the west could eventually accept the occupation and annexation of the Crimea, if the Russia stopped there (Herpen, 2014, pp. 257–258).

No doubt, state decision-maker like Obama considered the best option to choose a reasonable foreign policy to deal with Russia as international friendship more than NATO membership, demonstrating the point of Neoclassical realism assumption. Meanwhile, for the European leaders, they did not improve the terms of AA policy and firmly to commit with Ukraine's leaders as well as they did not explicitly discuss future movements (Marples, 2017, p. 26). The European state policy-makers preferably input into the process of policy-making and the final policy choices depending on how those political actors bargained among relevant political actors and institutions between the EU and Ukraine. However, they may not get positive impacts in the future, as the explanation of Neoclassical realism. Marples's statement above indicated the failure of western policy in luring Ukraine into the EU orbit. "The Western players underestimated the importance of Ukraine to Putin and his willingness to break the rules of the post-1991 international system in order to prevent what he saw as threats to Russia's national interests" (Rutland, 2015, p. 131). Rutland's description of Putin's intention to maximise his power through his varied decision to treat western players as a threat without concerning Russia's survival proved to be similar to the

Neoclassical realism assumption. Moreover, the European's non-sense requirement to release the ex-Prime Minister, Tymoshenko, within the policy of AA had signalled Yanukovich to commit with the EU in the late November 2013 (Marples, 2017, p. 42), but the truth is not so smooth for the political relationship between the EU and Ukraine. The failure of the Ukrainian government to sign the AA agreement at the Vilnius summit on November 2013 subsequently erupted the Euromaidan Evolution in Ukraine (Marples, 2017, p. 33). To explain Marples's statements by the Neoclassical realism approach, the idea to release Tymoshenko from the EU policy had inhibited Yanukovich from extracting and mobilising national resources for the publicly common idea to sign the AA agreement as to the proper role for Ukraine and its economy. The failure of the Ukraine government in signing the AA agreement in the Vilnius summit affected its national policy by ignoring the objective of international circumstance with EU organisation. Consequently, an interim meeting among Poland, French, Germany, Ukrainian former government, and opposition leaders in Ukraine on February 21, 2014, was purposely meant to "reduce the powers of the presidency-returning to the situation" and an election would be established [at] the end of the year (Marples, 2017, p. 43). State policy-makers in Ukraine initially contribute to the policy-making process through assistance with Poland, French, and Germany to decide the final policy choice (reduce the powers of the presidency-returning) depending on the relevant political actors among the Poland, French, and Germany that govern the policy-making process as the assumption of Neoclassical realism. However, it is considered helpless assistance due to the Russian invasion in Eastern Europe to support those separatists to engage political division internally in Ukraine. Consequently, the

Ukrainian government was overthrown based on the incident of Orange Revolution. The EU and US also failed to influence the course of events in the later stage. Some of the militants from the protests, for example, took over the Ministry of Internal Affairs threats from anti-Maidan elements to split the country initially proved futile. The

Right Sector, an integral part of the more violent aspects of the Euromaidan, has been removed from central Kyiv by the Ukrainian police (Marples, 2017, p. 44).

According to Neoclassical realism, domestic actors in Ukraine could affect the style and timing of national policy as well as affecting international responses in the EU and US.

After the Yanukovych presidency, a new president, Mr. Poroshenko, was elected. He immediately signed the AA agreement with the EU, but the negative impact is that it hardly provides a good return. It could be observed through the effect of the coal industry in Donbas, i.e. signing the EU agreement of economic integration has not assisted the enhancement of the economic benefits of the coal industry, especially in Donbas. It was due to the complete abandon of subsidies in the field of coal. Instead, the region was involved in the war (Marples, 2017, p. 55). Although the idea of signing the AA agreement was carried out by Mr. Poroshenko, the idea still inhibited him from extracting and mobilising Ukrainian resources to be integrated into Donbas economy due to the autonomy in Donbas that was assumed as the best solution. This is the assumption of Neoclassical realism approach. The AA agreement with EU is still regarded as a failure because many refugees and displaced persons had fled abroad, mostly to Russia, according to the UN data on August 2015 (Pleshakov, 2017, p. 133). Moreover, the current president, Mr. Poroshenko, did not intend to re-balance the political and diplomatic relations with Russia. Will Mr. Poroshenko regain Crimea under the sovereignty of Ukraine through the assistance of the UN or EU in the future? Does the Pro-Western policy capable to dissolve the aggressive policy of Russia? The signed AA failure agreement demonstrated the assumption of Neoclassical realism, domestic actors including the leader, Poroshenko in the Ukraine were affected various styles and timings of national policies as well as affecting international policies to respond among the Russia and EU.

The EU's plan to open up the Ukrainian economy brought it into conflict with Putin's efforts to create a deeper

economic union in the post-Soviet space. This was a priority for Putin, who was determined to forestall the expansion of EU influence and the presumed [democratisation] that would accompany it (Rutland, 2015, p. 129).

Putin, as the Neoclassical realist offers specific incentives in terms of Economy for Ukraine as an emulation of the thriving economy compared to the EU's plan through his innovative strategies to counter the EU expansion to the east. In fact,

92 UN member states refused to judge Russia's action in the Crimea. The handful of countries that joined Russia in voting against the [US-sponsored] UN resolution to condemn the annexation were either perennially anti-America or eating from the Moscow's hand: Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. [Nevertheless], among the countries that either abstained or did not vote were several third-world powerhouses and the US allies, including Afghanistan, Argentina, China, India, Iraq, Israel and Pakistan. All were involved in territorial disputes with other countries; none wanted the west as an arbiter (Pleshakov, 2017, p. 127).

as an obvious statement to remark as the failure of Pro-Western policies in the case of Ukraine Crisis.

Conclusion

The purpose of the UN Charter is mainly to maintain a peaceful community in the world after the WW2. Realistically, despite the existence of the UN Charter, chaos, conflict, and war are still emerging anywhere from time to time. In addition, the existing NATO and EU organisation did not function well to handle the causes of chaos, conflict, and war; thus, it reflects negatively on the statements of the UN Charter. The truth can be observed in the incidents of the Ukraine crisis and Crimea annexation. The

outcomes in the cases of Ukraine crisis and Crimea annexation could reflect specific functional weaknesses in the organisations of NATO and EU, which could not achieve the vision of UN to maintain equal peace in continental Europe. This chapter is based on the result of content analysis technique to analyse and discuss the limitations of NATO and EU to reflect the unrealistic principles of UN through three sections, i.e. the limitation of western policy in the Ukraine conflict, the weakness of NATO military power, and the failure of Pro-Western policies in the case of Ukraine crisis. The first section, i.e. the limitation of western policy in the Ukraine conflict can be observed through the explanation by Freedman, whereby Obama's administration was too cautious besides underestimation of Putin authoritarianism. The situation where the Russian leader considers the US as an enemy based on foreign policy choices could be referred to by the Neoclassical realism approach. Freedman also stated that western styles of economic sanctions were not relevant to the plans of western countries that were contrarily offering trading trends in Russia to prove the Neoclassical realism, in the assumption that Western Europe could change the styles or timings of economic sanctions based on trading policies with Russia to respond to international challenge such as the Ukraine crisis. Another scholar, Marples, explained the Euromaidan Evolution as the incident to demonstrate the failure of EU policies to stop and control protestors and separatists from overthrowing the Ukrainian government as well as its failure to unify all civilians in the orbit of Pro-Western policies. This situation is correctly explained by the Neoclassical realism assumption, whereby the domestic actors in Ukraine not only affect the style and timing of national policies but also affect the international challenges, as seen in the infiltration of EU and Russia policies. Marples also emphasized the limitations with the functional western policies in the incident of barricades on January 16, 2014, to prove the protesting ideology that overthrew the existing government in Ukraine inhibited the EU leaders from extracting and mobilising their resources. This situation is due to the common public ideas of the Ukrainians that overthrew the leadership of Yanukovich as a proper role for Ukraine and its economy, as explained by Neoclassical realism. The Western

policies failed to provide adequate supports in Kiev in February 2014, related to anti-democratic direction, referring to Freedman's statement. His statement can be defined by the Neoclassical realism approach where western leaders considered different decisions to enhance their powers but were not concerned regarding state survival in Ukraine. According to Pleshakov, the Ukraine conflict is regularly involved in various regional agents through foreign policies between the Pro-European and the Pro-Russian that is similar to the Neoclassical realism approach. The ideology of Pro-Western policy had facilitated and inhibited the Ukraine leaders from extracting and mobilising national resources depending on the social requirements for a series of proper arrangement to benefit Ukraine and its economy, while the Pro-European and Pro-Russian policies as international challenges had been influenced by the national policies of Ukraine leading to the response by the Ukraine actors. Marples also mentioned that many oligarchs, including Rinat Akhmetov and Dmytro Firtash, who were involved in the protest due to their powers are the cause of corruption and inequality of living standard in Ukraine; thus, abstaining the EU policies from resolving the internal problems in Ukraine. Limited Europe politics did not attract protesters to move into the EU. However, they would think about the future of Ukraine against the corrupted ruling regime led by internal oligarchs, including the case of Yanukovych who sacrificed his Prime Minister, Mykola Azarov, who was supported by opposition leaders. This complies with the statement of Marples, defined by the Neoclassical realism that the conflict among protesters and politicians have indeed transformed the national policies to conflict policies in the societies of Ukraine, as well as changing the international political relationship between the EU and Ukraine. Pleshakov stated that Ukraine had been struggling to be a nation through fragmentary domestic societies to encourage the internal population to choose between Russia and Europe. In the viewpoints of Neoclassical realism, domestic actors in Ukraine had affected the nature of internal policy by responding to the external policies such as the Pro-Western and the Pro-Russia policies. The ideologies that comprised of Pro-Western and Pro-Russia policies facilitated and inhabited Ukrainian leaders based on the contents of

ideologies, and it is a frequent public idea to decide the proper role of Ukraine and its economy onwards. The unwillingness of Yanukovich's supporters in the eastern region to integrate with EU is defined by both Marples and Walker, where the concept of Neoclassical realist approach in Ukraine had been distorted by Yanukovich's party as well as distorting the international sphere of world order through his intention to sign the AA agreement. Sakwa also indicated that Yanukovich returned his power after pre-term elections, associated with the EU negotiation on February 21, 2014. However, his presidency was perceived as short period by Putin because the act of signing the AA agreement restricted Yanukovich's effort to utilise internal resources depending on three causes, i.e. Putin's power, EU engagement, and internal societies about the proper role and its economy for Ukraine, derived from the idea of Neoclassical realism. The causes of gunfire, kidnapping, and violence related to Yanukovich's administration and his members were opposed to the EU policies, especially the human rights issue. However, his acts enhanced the opportunity for protestors until he lost his political status, as defined by Marples. It referred to the Neoclassical realism approach defined by Fordham, in general term, Yanukovich's leadership as the state leader to seek and maximise his power is likely to make a different decision than to pursue the more modest goal of national survival. Neoclassical realism approach also related to Yanukovich aggressive acts against protestors that had affected both national and EU policies in the international order. The AA agreement also covered some military security issues with little and short-term solutions under the economic conditions based on Sakwa's statement. According to the Neoclassical realism approach to define Sakwa's statement, western states provide partial incentives in Ukraine through innovative agreement because the international system of the world is competitive. Marples also mentioned that the wrong public perception on the loss of political power of the prime minister, Mykola Azarov, in the region of Donetsk, is the assumption of Neoclassical realism. The leader, Mr. Azarov, had made different decisions conversely to the former government to maximise his power purposely to retain his authority. However, the failure to retain a more extended

period of position for Mr. Azarov was due to fewer former delegations feared on the free-trade agreement of the EU policy to influence Ukrainian interests. Marples's statement is the real explanation regarding Neoclassical realism assumption, where both national policy and international level were affected by domestic actors such as Mr. Azarov. This Neoclassical realism assumption can explain the irrelevant societies in eastern Ukraine to deny the engagement of national policy to support the western policy as mentioned by Marples. Minor protestors in the eastern region disagree with supporting Ukrainian policy within the orbit of EU that led by Yanukovich's leadership. The disintegration of USSR is the cause for Ukrainians to have no intention to unify with the country, including the case of Donetsk-based regime, as emphasised by Marples, which can be defined similarly to the Neoclassical realism approach. Neo-classical realists believe that disintegrating perception among Ukrainian societies have been affecting the entire national policies as well as influencing international order, especially the EU policy. According to Kuzio's statement, many western scholars had interpreted the launched EU policies in 2009 to enlarge the policies in Eastern Europe as unreliable, and this is able to explain it by the Neoclassical realism approach, where EU internal actors can change EU policies to reflect international challenge such as the Ukraine crisis. It could be observed by Marples's statement, i.e. the case of declined coal generation in eastern Ukraine between January and April 2014 to indicate the denying of minority Ukrainians to obey to the rules of EU during the confrontation with the government. To further explain the Neoclassical realism approach, the confrontation between the government and separatists, in this case, is the problem to demonstrate the direct ignorance for both EU policy and Pro-Russia policy derived from the internal conflict. According to Marples's statement concerning the Neoclassical realism, Europe did not support Yanukovich's administration in handling cruel events in Ukraine, and the act affected external policy to delay the issue of signing AA agreement with Western Europe. There is no guarantee of stabilised Eastern Ukraine, based on the Minsk agreement as Foerster explained that western countries such as France, Germany, the US, and the UK did not

support the Minsk agreement. In explaining Foerster's statement by the Neoclassical realism approach, the mentioned western countries might concern their security issues to deploy specific strategies in Ukraine to foreclose alliance opportunities. The assumption of domestic actors in Ukraine could affect both the styles and timings of national and international policies that are relevant to Fomina's statement. Neoclassical realists able to describe official or unofficial protesting activities in Ukraine or out of Ukraine to support pro-democratic public opposition but not supporting the current government. Marples's mentions that the Euromaidan protesting gathering purposely to remove the government and presidency of Yanukovych is able to define it by the assumption of Neoclassical realism. The assumption of Neoclassical realism defines that the removal of leadership ideology could impede Yanukovych's efforts to extract and mobilise natural resources, either by approaching the Pro-Western policy or Pro-Russian policy for the proper roles of Ukraine and the economy based on the demonstration in Kiev central square. Marples also mentioned that the classified age between the younger generations and older generations comprising of EU supporters and non-EU supporters as those Neoclassical realists believe their actions had affected both local style of policies in Ukraine, as well as international style of policies, especially the EU policies. The leaders' ways to maximise powers without considering national survival is one of the Neoclassical realism assumptions to answer Marples's statement, brutal actions led by Yanukovych and his interior minister, Vitalii Zakharenko against internal citizens as a governmentally liberal movement. In addition, Neoclassical realism approach also explained both Yanukovych and his interior minister, Vitalii Zakharenko's decisions to deploy brutal actions against citizens because both leaders were able to extract and mobilise national resources based on their extents of ideologies to consider supporting governmental ideas as preferred roles for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Rutland defined Minsk negotiations as having no long-term solution in Eastern Ukraine during Poroshenko's presidency. Rutland's explanation can be interpreted by the Neoclassical realism approach, whereby Minsk agreement is the ideology to inhibit leaders from utilising national resources

with the contents of Minsk agreement contradicted for a proper role and its economy in Eastern Ukraine occupied by separatists. Moreover, the limitations of western policies such as the PfP plan has no collective security guarantee under NATO policies as provided by Moore's statement. In terms of the Neoclassical realism approach, PfP inhibits NATO leaders from exhausting resources depending on the ideology of PfP as the proper role for both NATO members and Ukraine due to the Neoclassical realists who considered foreign policy as a choice for the states of NATO. The incident of the Ukraine Crisis had gone through a series of the revolution that revealed the failure of NATO military power expansion in Eastern Europe. This situation is referring to both Herpen and Walker's statement as they defined the same meaning regarding the Bucharest NATO summit of April in 2008, where the Russian invasions in the Georgia War and Ukraine Crisis cannot be avoided based on the Membership Action Plan. The vast mobilisation is still engaged in the country, as the Neoclassical realists assumed that Russia, under Putin's leadership, feared the long-term threats. However, the country has a low level of external vulnerability in 2008. Power maximisation using different decisions but not necessarily considering a state's survival is the assumption of Neoclassical realism that is suitable to define the current Russian's state leader. Kuzio also mentioned that the Bucharest NATO Summit in April 2008 was warned by Putin, indicating that Ukraine would disintegrate upon joining NATO. It proved Putin's decision to maximise his power without considering the goal of state survival for Ukraine as the Neoclassical realism assumption. Moreover, MAP was also opposed by individual NATO members who worry about the Russian backlash in the future that defined by Wolff. His statement can be explained by the Neoclassical realism approach as the NATO actors are capable of altering MAP policy to respond the challenge of Russian invasion in the future. Putin's history could be traced back to the weaponry business relationship involving one billion Euro between Russia and France, one of the NATO members in 2008. The weaponry business relationship between Russia and France as defined by Herpen, demonstrate the failures of NATO and US to block Russia's military power against Georgia and Moldovan, as was

warned by the US on December 18, 2008. The economic interests, including military businesses between NATO and Russia through diplomatic relationships, are hardly able to deter Russian's military power as stated by the point of Neoclassical realism approach, where the successful causes of politic, military, and technological practice in France had been emulated by Russia in a competitive international system. Military integration or political reforms were two purposes mentioned in the 2010 Lisbon and 2012 Chicago Summit, but no promises were offered in these two Summits, as defined by Wolff. Wolff's statement could be interpreted by the Neoclassical scholar, Fordham, "state decision-makers consider both domestic and international friends and adversaries when making foreign policy choices" (Fordham, 2009, p. 253). Downplaying NATO's policy by Obama's administration appeared through the military withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan as a shifting policy to the US's internal affairs without or less concerning the problem in Ukraine. Herpen identified the truth of two Neoclassical realism assumptions by his statement where the US shifting policy from the Middle-east countries and Europe distorted international circumstance such as in the Ukraine crisis. Secondly, political actors and policy-makers in the US were the causes to ignore the European policy due to their final decision choices were dependent on bargaining among relevant politicians and institutions, including NATO. However, unfortunately, they were not prepared for the aggressiveness of the Russian policy in the case of the Ukraine crisis. Wolf also defined that the discussion of unreliable NATO membership with Ukraine could be associated with the incapability of Ukraine to handle the security problems in Crimea and the Donbas region. As Neoclassical realists say that NATO members consider their national securities to mobilise and maintain broad strategies in Europe, they might rationally consider the Ukraine crisis as objectively appearing irrelevant thoughts that foreclose alliance opportunities. In addition, Moore's statement also indicated that the NATO allies only provided non-lethal weapons for Ukraine as appealed by President Poroshenko. Ivanov stated that the PfP plan also has no security guarantee in the common defence mechanism. Both scholars, Moore and Ivanov, utilised the Neoclassical realism to explain that competitive

international system provided limited incentives for Ukraine due to NATO members countering political, military, and technological practices in Ukraine through their innovative plans or strategies. Meanwhile, Kalb mentioned the dedication of the US and NATO during or after the incidents of Crimea annexation and the Ukraine crisis as the symbol of weakness to deter Russian hostility. Neoclassical realism is a useful tool to explain foreign policy choices from the US and NATO as decisive policies to either ignore or distort the theme of international's terms and conditions between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, especially the deterrence issues. The last section is mainly focused on the failures of EU policies to intervene with Ukraine's sovereignty. Both authors, Foerster and Freedman define that the Budapest Declaration was signed in 1994 that had no assurance for Ukraine based on the problem of Crimea annexation which could be interpreted by the Neoclassical realism approach. As the Neoclassical realists believe decision-makers among Russia, the UK, and the US considered their national securities to mobilise and maintain reliable strategies differently in Ukraine purposely appeared as an aggressiveness to foreclose alliance opportunities. Both scholars, Herpen and Marples also mention that the case of DCFT in 2012 during Yulia Tymoshenko's administration as the failed case to pave a way for EU to deploy its policy in the Ukraine, she was guilty due to her selective utilisation of justice policy as the issue to delay the signing AA agreement with EU. To link the statement with the Neoclassical realism, the element of power in the maximisation of the EU leaders as selective decisions to improve the national sphere in Ukraine, including to release Yulia Tymoshenko, did not consider survival in entire Europe. Sakwa addressed the AA agreement as a technical agreement offered by the EU to escalate more security competitions between Russia and Atlantic states in Ukraine. Sakwa's statement was explained by Neoclassical realism, where Russia and the Atlantic state's decision-makers could consider international opponents referring to the security policy choices. Additionally, Rutland also defined that Yanukovich still supported the Moscow policy and intended to bring back Ukraine to Russia's space during his presidency. To define Rutland's statement as the Neoclassical realist's viewpoint,

Yanukovych intends to enhance his power to include Ukraine's interest more than its survival. The delaying issue to sign the AA agreement in the hand of Yanukovych had been continued from Tymoshenko's administration. The delay in signing the AA agreement, which continued in the year of 2013, continues during the administration of Yanukovych as the failure to launch the EU's juridical policies in Ukraine. Herpen explained this situation as Neoclassical realists believed that the EU policies did not react the actual circumstance in international level relating to the relationship between Russia and Ukraine. The EU political agreement and economic chapters offered for Ukraine in 2014 had been postponed a year to give a chance for Russia to bring peace in eastern Ukraine, as explained by Rutland, which is defined by the statement of Neoclassical realism. EU actors could change both political policy and economic policy to delay implementations to respond to the Russian invasion in Ukraine. Marples and Walker defined that Yanukovych's background issues were not relevant to the EU policies. Yanukovych's failure to handle Ukrainian problems internally and the external Russia depression against his authority that could be defined by the Neoclassical realism assumption. Domestic political actors and policy-makers in the organisation of EU preferred to contribute to the initial policy-making process for Ukraine. However, the final policy choice depended among relevant political actors and institutions between the EU organisation and Ukraine. According to Marples, the economic recession since the independence of Ukraine in 1991 has not improved Ukraine's economic sphere based on both the falling population and GDP from 1991. From Neoclassical Realist's viewpoint, the cause of economic recession is the public perception on the incapability of the current leadership to flourish the economy of Ukraine and restrict Yanukovych's efforts in the management to extract and mobilise Ukraine's resources, as the assumed by Marples. The EU agreement is just a temporary solution for Ukraine, as observed by Marples, referring to the opposition parties against Yanukovych's decision to sign the AA agreement as the mandatory solution to prevent the continuing criminal government and also defying the removal of Russian oligarchs in the country. Ukrainian opposition parties affected the

national policies and the EU relationship in the case of signing the AA agreement to reflect international response with Russia as the assumption of Neoclassical realism. The identity of Yanukovich was more associated with eastern Ukraine and his willingness to assist and work with Russian demands and Crimea, as mentioned by Kuzio, could be interpreted by the Neoclassical realism assumption. Neoclassical realism assumes that power maximisation requires the expansion of opportunities in a world of uncertainty and anarchy due to fear among other states, similar to the assumptions by Schweller as the Neoclassical realist. Sloan mentioned that the failed implementations of the Western policy, such as the NATO policy in Ukraine were due to weaponry businesses between Russia and the EU members. Sloan's statement has a precise meaning related to the Neoclassical realism approach, whereby the NATO organisation can affect specific policies derived from its imperfect transmitting limitation to ignore or distort the threat from Russia. Marples also mentioned that the free trade connection between the EU and Ukraine might gain mutual benefits if Yanukovich successfully joins the AA policies. In contrast, internal political conflict deterred Ukraine from joining Russia's policy as Yanukovich inhibited his intention to extract or mobilise national resources as well as restriction of signing the AA based on his extents of perception with national interest about the proper role for Ukraine and its economy, and this is the perception of Neoclassical realism. The insufficient patient attitude of EU prolonged the process to sign the AA agreement by the Ukrainian parliament and cabinet from as highlighted by Marples. Marple's statement could be indicated by the assumption of Neoclassical realism. Neoclassical realists assume that cause of foreign policy choice for the EU to consider the issue of delaying to sign the AA agreement by the Ukrainian government as the skeptical friendship in the case of Ukraine crisis. The failure to recognize the US's hegemonic power was mentioned by both scholars, Herpen and Marples, in the case of the Ukraine crisis, defining that the disagreement of Senator McClain to support Obama's plan as the Neoclassical realist perspective to define that the indication of US distorted particular objectives through the removal of authoritarian government affecting the Ukrainian's national policies. NATO, as

the western policy, is committed to promoting the partnership concept for Ukraine and other potential countries without positive impacts based on the Ukraine crisis and Russia invasion, as stated by Moore. According to the approach of Neoclassical realism, the decision makers-among the NATO members and Russia could consider either friendship or adversaries when making foreign policy choices. Moore's statement could also be defined by the Neoclassical realism approach to understanding that state actors can alter styles or timing of policies in Ukraine to respond to the NATO partnership concept. Herpen also mentioned that Obama's personal decisions were over-confident to handle foreign affairs as wrongly directed towards Russia because he shifted the foreign policies from Europe to Asia. The choice of foreign policy was made by Obama to decide friendly diplomatic relation with Russia as the US decision-maker, and the Neoclassical realists assumed that Obama's leadership might maximise his power to ignore the survival of the US and Europe through different decision while shifting the foreign policies from Europe to Asia. Furthermore, as defined by Jadwiga Kiwerska, Obama made good relations with Russia more than the NATO's members, based on the confidential conversation between Obama and Medvedev in March 2012. The wellbeing relation between the US and Russia through diplomacy is referred to the weak response from Obama in the case of Poland annexation with NATO membership, as defined by Herpen. The reason can be explained by the Neoclassical realism assumption, where the state decision-maker, Mr. Obama preferred to choose a reasonable foreign policy with Russia as a true friendship more than the NATO membership. Marples defined that no specific plan was promoted from the AA policy for Ukraine as the European state-makers decide the final policy choices depending on how those political actors bargained among relevant political actors and institutions. Those political actors and institutions in the EU unable to provide input processes for the Ukraine which may not get significant impacts in the future. Putin had broken certain international rules post-1991 when he perceived the western countries as a threat to Russia's interest, according to Rutland. Rutland's statement could be explained by the Neoclassical realism assumption, where Putin, as the state leader, attempted to enhance

his power by deciding on the different matter to counter western player for Russia's interest. Yanukovych delayed the decision to sign the AA while Tymoshenko released issues as the cause to expose various riots in Ukraine, stated Marples to demonstrate the inefficiency of EU's administration. The Neoclassical realism approach assumed by Marples identified the EU policy as inhibiting Yanukovych's decisions to extract and mobilise national resources for the publicly common idea to sign the AA agreement as a proper role for Ukraine and its economy. In contrast, the Ukraine government also affected national policy related to the failure of signing the AA agreement as ignoring the international sphere within the EU organisation. Consequently, on February 21, 2014, four countries, i.e. Poland, French, Germany, and Ukraine decided on an election in the end of the year to avoid the returning of Yanukovych presidency by the explanation of Marples. His explanation logically states by the Neoclassical realism approach, state policy-makers in the Ukraine initially input into the policy-making process with the consensus from Poland, French, and Germany to decide the final policy choice to purposely reduce the returning powers of Yanukovych presidency, which depended on the relevant political actors among the three mentioned countries that governed the policy-making process. However, the Russian invasion in Eastern Europe failed to initiate the political division breakthrough of EU and the US in Ukraine that was observable by the Orange Revolution, defined by Marples as the consideration to explain it by the Neoclassical realism. The domestic actors in Ukraine could affect the style and timing of national policy as well as affecting international responses in the EU and US. The failure of signing the AA agreement by Mr. Poroshenko could be observed through the abandoned subsidies in the coal industry in Donbas without economic benefit. According to the Neoclassical realism perspective, signed AA agreement was the idea to inhibit Mr. Poroshenko from extracting and mobilising Ukrainian resources to be integrated into Donbas economy because the publicly common idea considered autonomy in Donbas as the best solution for it. Pleshakov mentioned the absence of a political balance and diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Russia concerning the forceful displacement of peoples over Russia after

the signing of the AA agreement. The Neoclassical realism also assumes that Mr. Poroshenko and the domestic actors affected various styles and timings of national policies as well as the international policies to respond among Russia and EU as the logical assumption of Neoclassical realism. Putin, as the Neoclassical realist, offered his successful economic union as an incentive for Ukraine to forestall the expansion of the EU in Eastern Europe via his innovative strategy based on the statement of Rutland. Putin created a specific economic union to forestall the expansion of the EU to prevent the EU from democratising Ukraine. In addition, Pleshakov also emphasized that the unwillingness of some of the 92 UN countries to judge the actions of Russia in the case of Crimea annexation as the outcome to avoid western countries as arbiters to conclude the failure of Pro-Western policies in the case of Ukraine crisis. The contribution of this study is mainly to discover the failures of Pro-Western policies based on the outcomes of the Ukraine crisis as well as the failures of Pro-Western policies to deter Russia invasion in Ukraine. Additionally, the limitations of Pro-Western policies in the case of the Ukraine crisis consisted of assumptions of the possible Neoclassical realism approach. However, this study also has certain limitations because it solely utilises secondary sources without getting primary data for a qualitative approach. Secondly, this study was restricted to the Neoclassical realism approach without considering other international relations theories. For future studies, researchers or scholars may apply the liberal approach to explain the flow of Pro-Western policies in the case of the Ukraine crisis as well as broadening the scope that involves economic status to analyse and explain the issues of the Ukraine crisis.

Lessons Learnt




Figure 1. *The Limitations of Pro-Western Policies* [Source: owned by the author]

Consequently, both cases of the Ukraine crisis and Crimea annexation (Fig. 1) are the facts to prove various inabilities of western policies that comprised the UN Charter, NATO policy, and EU policy after the Russian invasion in Ukraine. No reliable implementations from the US, EU members, and NATO members are available to deter the aggressiveness of Russian intervention in Ukraine. The Neoclassical realism approach reasonably defines the flow of processes on the issues related to the inabilities of Pro-Western policies in the cases of the Ukraine crisis and Crimea annexation. The neoclassical realism perspective is the fact that explains the weaknesses of Pro-Western policies in both cases of the Ukraine crisis and Crimea annexation.

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